Good news on future of BOM - Page 17

WTE_Galway · #**161** 11-21-2012, 05:17 AM

Guderian attributed much of the early German success to the "operational" level of planning between tactical and strategic which only existed informally in other armed forces.

Also bear in mind that Adolf Hitler's tendency to favor and encourage bold unusual and slightly risky ideas and plans (capturing the massive Belgian fortress Eben-Emael by landing gliders on top of it for example) worked against the Germans later in the war when caution was advised but it was usually to their benefit in these early years.

*Buzzsaw* · #**162** 11-21-2012, 06:23 AM

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Originally Posted by lonewulf

As regard's German so-called Blitzkrieg tactics, these are more myth than reality. There was nothing revolutionary about German combined arms tactics in 1939-41 and in reality these were just an extension of the tactics developed by the Germans in 1914-18.

Gonna have to disagree with you. Ludendorff's "Kaiserschlact" attacks of Spring 1918 used none of the concept of deep penetration and attack on rear objectives which were characteristic of German armoured doctrine in WWII. Yes, the Stossstruppen used infiltration techniques on a tactical level which involved bypassing strongpoints instead of assaulting them, but there was no combined arms with tanks, the Germans barely had any tanks available. And Ludendorff did not know how to exploit his initial successes, he had no plan to feed reserves through the holes he created, and get into the Allied rear areas. In fact, the Allied commanders in WWI were much better at exploiting success than the Germans, they managed to break the conflict out into open countryside out of the trenches by October of 1918 in their counter-offensive.

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Although the Germans were no doubt flattered by the attention their endeavours received in 1939-40, they tended to attribute their battlefield successes to the fighting spirit of their soldiers, which they believed, and with very good reason, to be second to none (National Socialist furvour no doubt playing a role here).

Gonna have to disagree with you again. Ironically the Wehrmacht under Adolf Hitler, a totalitarian dictator who insisted on complete obedience to his wishes, was actually the most democratic institution in Nazi Germany. Initiative in this new German army was encouraged on all levels, junior Wehrmacht officers, even NCO's were encouraged to take decisions which in other armies, such as the French and British, would be referred upwards in the chain of command, hence causing delays and failures to exploit opportunities. Some of the greatest successes the Germans achieved were as a result of junior commanders following this spirit of initiative, and ignoring the directions of their superiors. In the Battle of France, both Guderian and Rommel ignored Hitler's and their superior's orders to stop short after crossing the Meuse, and instead drove forwards at a relentless pace because they knew they had the French on the run. Only the Americans developed a Officer corps which was capable of showing the same level of initiative in the junior levels. There was not a lot of "National Socialist" fervour in the Wehrmacht, to the contrary, it was the largest source of opposition to Hitler once he started to run into trouble. Yes, Hitler did create an elite body of troops in the SS Panzertruppen, who were committed Nazis, but surprisingly, if you look at their combat record, they were no more effective, in many cases worse, than the standard Wehrmacht Panzer divisions. The Divisions with the best record in the German army were the 116th Panzer Division, and the 2nd Panzer Division. Look at the Battle of the Ardennes. The 6th Panzer Army under SS General Seip Dietrich, all SS Divisions, failed in its breakout attempt, despite much better equipment. The Wehrmacht Panzer divisions in the 5th Panzer Army, under Wehrmacht General Manteuffel were the ones who actually broke out through the American lines and made the deepest penetration. Unfortunately for them, and fortunately for the rest of us, the lead Panzer Divisions ran out of fuel just short of the Meuse river and were surrounded and slaughtered by one of the US Army's best Tank commanders, Ernest Harmon of the 2nd Armoured division. Contrary to the myths perpetuated by the Patton cheerleading section, this was the real critical moment of the Battle not the relief of Bastogne.

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Those who disagree with this view should have a hard look, in first instance, at the tanks the Germans were supposedly intending to use to spearhead their "revolutionary" new tactics in Poland and France. In the main these were composed of Panzer I and IIs, both essentially training vehicles and both essentially obsolete in 1939. The French Char B and the British Matildas, for example, easily out gunned and out-armoured their German counterparts and should have and could have easily eliminated their thin-skinned German opposition – if correctly used. The French air force, which was easily a match for the Germans on paper, simply failed to put in an appearance. The success of the German's Sickle-cut plan, which was an improvisation put together in haste in 1940, was very much due to the sheer guts and determination of the men charged with it's execution. A properly organized French defence could have and should have stopped it in its tracks, but in the face of German resolve, that defence simply crumbled away.

Again, you are ignoring the facts. In the case of Poland, the Polish had only 45 tanks, which were obsolete R35's. In fact, by far the majority of the French tank forces were comprised of these same obsolete Renault R35 tanks dating from 1933. These had weak armour, a low velocity inaccurate 37mm gun designed for fighting infantry, and were not a match for the Panzer II's high velocity 20mm, which were the majority of the German tank force. The 20mm on the Panzer II could penetrate the R35's turret at 100 meters, the 37mm on the R35 could not penetrate the Panzer. The Panzer II was a fine tank, quite fast and maneuverable for its time, it had a top speed of 40km/hr compared to 20 km/hr for the R35. In addition, almost all French tanks had no radios, which meant the tanks could not work in concert, and their commanders had to load and fire as well as call out maneuver commands, something which did not work in practice. Imagine leaning out your turret and waving a flag to try to get the remainder of your tank platoon to follow a direction... Yes, there were some Char B's and Somua S-35's, but they were the minority, the next most numerous French Tank was the Hotchkiss H35, which was as slow as the R35, and had the same poor gun, with weaker armour, which was notorious for bad manufacturing and weak spots which were easily penetrated. The most numerous British tank was the Mk VIA, which was very much inferior to the Panzer II, having weak armour and a MG as armament. There were very few Matildas.

And the French airforce was not a match for the Germans, they had nowhere near the same number of Squadrons in the air, their infrastructure could not support the number of aircraft they had in reserve. Also the Morane 406, the most numerous French fighter was simply not a match for the 109E. Only the Curtis H75 and Dewoitine 520 were a match and the 520 was manufactured in small numbers while the Curtiss was an American import. (Curtiss H-75's shot down more German aircraft than any other French manned fighter)

lonewulf · #**163** 11-21-2012, 06:32 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by csThor

Pardon my french, lonewolf, but 'Nuts!' The term "Blitzkrieg" is indeed no german invention but of course Goebbels was quick to utilize it. In a few significant sectors, especially in doctrine and force structure, the Wehrmacht was clearly ahead of its western opponents - be it the french with their defensively minded idea of warfare and tanks which couldn't decide whether to be infantry support or "exploitation" (and in the end they were neither) nor the british with the problems the nasty feuds of the 20s and 30s had left behind and which was mirrored in the ineffective structure of their forces (especially the armored divisions which were no combined arms formations in 1940). The doctrinal environment the term "Blitzkrieg" describes is nothing more than the traditional prusso-german way of war just with the added element of tanks and aircraft - it reenabled the Wehrmacht to prosecute the war as a war of movement on the operational level, just like its great ancestors under the Great Elector Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg-Preussen, Friedrich II or Moltke the Elder.

If I may offer a book recommendation: Robert M Citino "The German way of War".

Yeah well, nuts to you too m8

Actually, I'm not sure my position is all that different from your own.

I said: "There was nothing revolutionary about German combined arms tactics in 1939-41 and in reality these were just an extension of the tactics developed by the Germans in 1914-18."

csThor · #**164** 11-21-2012, 08:16 AM

The "Nuts" was really more aimed at your comments re "fervour" and "NS indoctrinization". In fact I'd hesitate to make such broad statements on any armed forces. I'd not attribute the Red Army of 1945 a particularly "communist fervour", rather the ancient concept of "the victor takes it all".

csThor · #**165** 11-21-2012, 08:26 AM

@ Buzzsaw

The better equipment of the Waffen-SS is pretty much as mystical as many urban myths about WW2. For example even in 1944 none of the german Panzer Divisions, regardless whether they were Heer or Waffen-SS, had enough half-tracks to equip its two Panzergrenadier Regiments with them. So even the "elite" SS never got everything it wanted. It often needed more replacements because these divisions tended to get the "suicide assignments" and suffered accordingly.

And as for the Ardennes Offensive ... Sepp Dietrich himself said it best.

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"All Hitler wants me to do is to cross a river, capture Brussels, and then go on and take Antwerp! And all this in the worst time of the year through the Ardennes, where the snow is waist deep and there isn't room to deploy four tanks abreast, let alone panzer divisions! Where it doesn't get light until eight and it's dark again at four and with reformed divisions made up chiefly of kids and sick old men - and at Christmas!"

I recently purchased the excellent "The Battle of the Bulge - Then and Now" because I want to make an accurate model of a King Tiger of schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 501 and the advance of Panzergruppe Peiper was held up mostly by the atrocious state of the roads and timely destruction of key river crossings by the US forces. This, in turn, forced them into the confrontation at Stoumont - La Gleize and thwarted any chance of a decisive breakthrough. The whole idea of "Wacht am Rhein" was ludicrous given the looming Red Army in the East ...

Insuber · #**166** 11-21-2012, 09:49 AM

No news on future of BOM.

klem · #**167** 11-21-2012, 09:52 AM

lonewulf, sorry to add to the pile, but a flaw in your statement about Hitlers objective in Russia retains the flaw in Hitler's own perception of victory in Russia.

Hitler believed that by capturing Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad etc he would defeat Russia, because the Russians would capitulate. He wouldn't have because they wouldn't have. Stalin would have (and was already) withdrawing Eastward where he was relocating his production facilities and rebuilding his forces as well as drawing on forces from Mongolia etc. If Hitler did not pursue him Stalin would have re-built and come back against him as he did in any case and with far superior numbers and equipment (for the region). If Hitler did pursue him through the sccorched earth of Russia he would have been unable to sustain his forces and eventually he would have been crushed, as in fact happened to his 6th Army when he was no-where near as stretched. He may have captured the Caucuses and the Ukraine wheat fields but sustained forces means both supplies and men and I don't think he had the manpower to stretch that far. These are the reasons why I don't think Hitler could ever have defeated Russia. His perception of victory was flawed.

The Russians might have welcomed Hitler with open arms after Stalin but as Hitler had pronounced them sub-human and the German forces took full advantage of their conquest with killings, rapings, destruction, etc, the Russians weren't likely to take kindly to the Germans.