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#1
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Quote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavochkin_La-7 Only 115 La-7s were lost in air combat Do you still think they didn't move a huge step forward? Sure it's a commonplace the Soviets fought by their numbers. It still was probably true on the ground. But in the air things had already been different. |
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#2
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I stand by my words. Using wiki as source is not exactly helpful to any discussion since it can contain virtually anything ... It is very difficult to get an accurate picture of soviet capabilities and achievements because of the utter distortions that entered soviet archives on behalf of Stalin. Secondly just listing one thing and trying ot impose it on the whole of the VVS is simply pointless. The number of La-7 lost in combat is one aspect of a large number: relative ratio between the various soviet types, lack of fighter forces of the Luftwaffe and its allies, mission profiles, actual engagements between La-7 and the Luftwaffe (and what types they encountered), ... That list is very long.
Post-war several german officers were hired by the US Army to produce a load of memoranda on a load of things to get the perspective of their former enemies on their own strengths and weaknesses but more importantly to get a more complete picture on soviet capabilities and faults. And most of these german officers (Army and Luftwaffe alike) attibute the soviets an utter predictability when it came to tactics, a lack of flexibility and gross negligance of command, control & coordination. The soviets just had the numbers to get away with it. PS: Taking the La-7 is a bad choice, anyway, since according to all the information I have they were issued only to specific regiments and were freed from the tight doctrinal leash the VVS kept on its fighter forces. That allowed them more freedom and gave these units a better chance to enter combats from a position of advantage. The big rest of the VVS, however, wasn't freed from the doctrinal straightjacket. |
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#3
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Quote:
This may be something trustworthy: http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/englis...ikov/part4.htm A.S. When did well-trained cohorts begin to arrive in the combat regiments? N.G. Somewhere in the second half of 1944. We fought the second half of the war in modern equipment and had acquired good combat experience. The loss levels in combat regiments were dropping and regiments began to demand significantly fewer replacements. From this came the possibility of pilots being sent directly from flight school to reserve air regiments [ZAP], where their instructors were combat-experienced pilots. At the ZAPs young pilots practiced only combat flying, and in a quite serious manner. After the ZAPs these pilots moved on to combat regiments with good combat habits. The ZAP was one of the most needed and effective components of the Soviet school of combat training. |
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