Inaccurate performance data for BOB fighters in COD comparing to RL data

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by NZtyphoon

Time to answer this directly: I have read the relevant sections in "Australia in the War of 1939-45: Civil: War Economy 1939-42 by S J Butlin. (Petrol and Substitute Fuels 280-292)

http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listi...condition=used

Let me translate what it actually.

NZTyphoon found the Second World War Official Histories, legally and freely available to anyone at the Australian Goverment's website at http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/second_world_war/

Instead of giving the link where everyone could check what the source said, he magnamiously shared an amazon link, where people can buy, what he could read for free. Of course nobody will buy the books, so he can 'quote' them in any way he see it to his liking. At wikipedia he often resorted to this, 'backing' his own ideas that he wanted to be included to the enrichment of the wider public with references to the works of respected authors, even though those authors never said anything like it.

Let's see now some examples.

1) There was no "Australian Military Commission" or any such organisation in Britain during WW 2.

Says NZTyphoon - the 'ustralia in the War ' official histories of course make no such statement. But, as we are all aware, NZTyphoon have told us recently with equivalent certainty that British tanker losses were marginal, then it was shown that they've lost 600 000 GRT worth of tankers in the year under question according to the records.

2a) The Australian Government dealt directly with the oil companies when requesting stock of fuels of all types, including aviation fuels. "After the outbreak of war stocks continued to come from the oil companies and to be imported and distributed through their organisation...there were special features in the requirements of the forces: fuel oil for the navy; petrol for the army; and the special high grade aviation fuel for the air force. (p. 285): "Liaison with the oil companies had been maintained from before the war..."(p. 286):

Only the bottomline is missing from the quote - see below. Yes Australia contact various oil companies for supply. For various reasonons detailed below, the companies could not get the oil to Australia.

b) Lord Beaverbrook and the Ministry of Aircraft Production had nothing whatsoever with deciding what types of fuels were supplied to Australia, nor how much. The Australian War Cabinet made decisions on aviation fuel supply and storage

This is a classic strawmen arguement. Strawmen arguements are about deliberately misrepresenting the other's actual position, and then 'disproving' that distorted position, and therefore 'winning' the argument.

In reality however, nobody said or claimed that it was Lord Beaverbrook and/or the Ministry of Aircraft Production were deciding what types of fuels were supplied to Australia, nor how much.

The context in what Beaverbrook's name came up was that Pips found a paper, that says that British were worried about 100 octane fuel position for the future, and decided to halt further 100 octane conversions until the supplies could be secured.

The paper wan copied by the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, [b]by[b] Roll Royce [b]to[b] Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

As you can see, Beaverbrooks name came up in a different context, and nobody said Beaverbook decided in the question.

"In August 1940 the War Cabinet was asked for a decision on aviation spirit stocks....The suggestion therefore was that the Department of Supply should purchase 3,000,000 gallons and that three 1,200,000-gallon storage tanks be built. The Cabinet approved the purchase...(p. 287)

And this is classic selective quoting. NZTyphoon wishes to create the impression that Australia was fully autonomous in fuel suppy, that they had no contract whatsoever with the British in that regard etc. He wants people to believe that the background of the papers has been fabricated, the Australian goverment was in such an excellent position with regard of fuel, that discussions with the British about fuel supplies is a surreal idea.

This has been not the case, however. The bits on pages 288-289 tell a whole lot more of the story, which is I believe why NZTyphoon was careful not to share his source in the first place. You can't cherry pick qoutes if anyone can find it out in a minute, now can you?

Pages 288-289 in full:

In August 1940 the War Cabinet was asked for a decision on aviation
spirit stocks . Before the war the plan had been for a reserve of 6,400,00 0
gallons (that is, the requirements of nineteen squadrons) and although
this had not been achieved (approximately 5,500,000 was the holding )
it did not matter so much because a force of nineteen squadrons had no t
been achieved either. When the Empire Air Training Scheme requirement s
could be calculated the companies had agreed to increase their holding s
progressively, but now plans were afoot to expand the force to thirty-tw o
squadrons, the present contract was to expire on 31st December, and i t
was "not considered reasonable that the present contractors should b e
requested to further increase their stocks without some assurance of continuance
of business for a reasonable period " . 2 The suggestion therefor e
was that the Department of Supply should purchase 3,000,000 gallon s
and that three 1,200,000-gallon storage tanks should be built .

The Cabinet approved the purchase and sent the storage problem to the Commonwealth
Oil Board. The board recommended six 200,000-gallon tanks—two each
in three centres, to be approved by the Air Staff . But by March 1941
the three centres were revised to twelve and the total capacity was no w
4,030,000 gallons .

There might be grounds for satisfaction with these attempts to provide
extra storage tanks ; there could be none over the provision of the petrol
they were intended to hold . After the reduction of the ration which came
into force on 1st April 1941, the Supply Minister in the middle of that
month placed before the full Cabinet comparative sales figures for six
months. 3 "The effect of rationing and of all other inducements to reduced
consumption," he submitted, "may therefore be estimated at a figur e
of 16 per cent (that is, consumption has been reduced by 16 per cent) . "
Diversion of tankers to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom, side
by side with the persistently high sales, had reduced stocks to 82,000,00 0
gallons, "with no immediate prospects of restoring stocks even to thei r
former level" .

[b]By the beginning of May he reported "the prospective stock position
has deteriorated so much and the prospects of tankers are so uncertain
that I feel bound to report the matter to Cabinet ". He complained about
inability to get information from the United Kingdom authorities despite
attempts by the Prime Minister and another visiting parliamentarian. The
Government had protested about "our insecurity" with reference to tankers
and had been promised a tanker programme which, if maintained, woul d
bring stocks at the end of June to about 65,000,000 gallons . 4

Meantime on 2nd May the minister sought and received permission to
reduce use of private cars and cycles to 2,000 miles a year and to make
varying percentage reductions in other classes to fulfil the one-third cu t
"recommended by the original rationing board about twelve months ago" .


BTW, did anyone notice that despite I and others have asked him many times to post the alleged text in its full context from Payton - Smith, he always evades that request?

3) What did need to be co-ordinated with the British was the shipment, allocation of tankers etc. "Diversion of tankers to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom...(p. 28

Again, the quoting is selective and out of context; reading the full text reveals that aviation fuel reserves could not be met, despite previous contacting with various companies. The reasons were two-fold: the British were buying up much what was available in the (American) market, which had finite amounts of 100 octane to offer. Indeed this is a returning subject in all British papers, can sufficient amount of American supply secured?

Secondly, Australia had no sea-going tanker capacity worth to mention - all oil had to be imported in British-owned tankers.

In short, the context of the Australian Military Commission's mission to Britain about getting 100 octane was that the Australians tried to build up large reserves, constructed tanks to hold it, but they couldn't buy enough on the market, and couldn't transfer it to Australia, because - despite NZTyphoons's claims that the British had no tanker capacity problems whatsoever, everything was green and nice - the Brits who controlled the whole Commonwealth tanker capacity suddenly decided to use the whole to their own purposes.

This left the Australians in an unenviable position, their reserves were dropping, and had to introduce severe rationing of fuel to the civilian sector to ensure sufficient reserves for the military.

The Page 288:

The army's figures were repeated in a submission by the Minister fo r
Supply to the full Cabinet on 11th June 1941, in which he reported tha t
the new ration scale to bring consumption to a figure of 20,000,000 gallon s
a month was now in force . But news of future tankers was poor. In an
endeavour to bring aviation spirit reserves up, only 7,000,000 gallons o f
motor spirit would come in in June ; quantities for July were uncertain .
The minister recounted at length the sorry story of the delay in rationing
and that "it resulted in only half the saving in consumption that had been
forecast by the motor trade whose advice had been accepted by the
Government in August". He reiterated the statement that no warning was
given by the United Kingdom of any alteration in the tanker position an d
only early in 1941 was it known that diversions, thought to be temporary ,
would become pronounced.

He concluded :
It is open to question whether severe rationing of the order I am now bound t o
suggest should be conducted by the civil authorities on their own account or unde r
the authority of the army . The army in association with my Controller of Liqui d
Fuels has evolved a mobilisation petrol scheme which would be operated by my
department. I gather that the army would prefer the rationing to be conducte d
entirely under the authority of my department .
In view of the opinion expressed by the Oil Board, strongly supported as it is
by the Department of the Army, I have no option but to recommend that I be
authorised to reduce the monthly consumption of motor spirit for civil purposes
to a level of 12,000,000 per month as soon as that may be practicable . If necessary
the use of private cars other than for business purposes could be stopped as from
the beginning of next month and certain other classes could be reduced at the sam e
time . The full scheme could not be introduced, unless the Army Mobilisation System
were brought in, until August . ?

Such proposals were drastic ; but the Cabinet deferred only long enough
to ask the Minister for Supply to present two schedules, one with, an d
one without, private cars (that is, class 2 in the rationing schedule) ,
designed to bring consumption to the required 12,000,000 gallons . 8 The
decision was to keep private cars on the road, but to allow them 1,00 0
miles a year only . The following evening, 17th June, the Prime Ministe r
announced the reductions which would begin with the August issue o f
ration tickets .

The shoe was beginning to pinch . If further restrictions were needed—
and no one could say that they would not be—some thought would have
to be given to other ways of economising : rationalising delivery services ,
zoning, transport pools . In effect, for the future, the petrol problem was
not just one of simple restriction. Like so many other problems it could
no longer be dealt with in isolation, and indicative of the Government ' s
realisation of the need to relate problems one with another, the Prime
Minister included in his reorganised....

The book should be available through libraries, second hand bookshops etc so anyone can check.

Or at the Australian Goverments website, where you have found it yourself while researching the Australian online archives, should you bothered to give a link to it.

http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/second_world_war/

The pages I have provided the full quote can be found here: http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/rec...l-vol3-ch8.pdf

[Kurfürst]

@Glider about post 401.

I am afraid I cannot answer you in detail now due to the lack of time and won't be in the position to do so in the next two weeks.

On the other hand, I do not see any appearance new evidence or even argument in your post, as it only repeats the ones you have been telling us in the last 40 pages of discussion, and probably no undue haste should be spent in addressing these points again.

FYI I have looked over about 1500 pages of 'War Cabinet' and related files at Kew.
I could not find any decision about the alleged full conversion of Fighter Command to 100 octane in the War Cabinet Minutes.

Which tells me that the reason you can't find any reference to 100 octane 'conversion freeze' in the War Cabinet Minutes either is because it was discussed and decided at lower levels, in one of the apprx. 200 War Cabinet commitees - which still are the part of the War Cabinet.

For the number of Committees, please refer to the relevant page of the National Archives website which provides general information about the War Cabinet on the apropos providing 'open access' to the public via digital copies.

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

@Glider about post 401.

I am afraid I cannot answer you in detail now due to the lack of time and won't be in the position to do so in the next two weeks.

On the other hand, I do not see any appearance new evidence or even argument in your post, as it only repeats the ones you have been telling us in the last 40 pages of discussion, and probably no undue haste should be spent in addressing these points again.

FYI I have looked over about 1500 pages of 'War Cabinet' and related files at Kew.
I could not find any decision about the alleged full conversion of Fighter Command to 100 octane in the War Cabinet Minutes.

Which tells me that the reason you can't find any reference to 100 octane 'conversion freeze' in the War Cabinet Minutes either is because it was discussed and decided at lower levels, in one of the apprx. 200 War Cabinet commitees - which still are the part of the War Cabinet.

For the number of Committees, please refer to the relevant page of the National Archives website which provides general information about the War Cabinet on the apropos providing 'open access' to the public via digital copies.

You have hit on a key item, I never claimed that the War Cabinet approved or decided on the roll out of 100 Octane fuel. It wasn't their decision.
The point is that this Pips clearly stated that the War Cabinet halted the roll out, that they restarted it later, they didn't it would be in the minutes. This paper if it exists is wrong. If you believe that someone else made the decision find it,, and explain why Pips made such an obvious mistake.

You have stated a number of times that you believe in his paper, that is your choice. I suggest you prove that any statment, he made on any topic on the paper is correct and I do mean any statement, your choice. Something, anything to confirm that any point is correct.

The choice is huge. Take the 25% being converted when the roll out stopped, with 75% of FC using 87 octane you should be able to find something. The Oil Committee who were responsible for the purchase storage and distribution must, if its true, mention it somewhere.

[Kurfürst]

Glider,

Pips didn't say it was mentioned in War Cabinet Minutes papers - that's something that you seem to be reading into it, and you have entered a circular logic, that you think it should be in the papers titled 'War Cabinet minutes'' in CAB 65 (iirc) reference, and since it isn't, Pip's research is wrong. The logical error is clear to see, and I think mistake (in logic) is your's not Pip's.

The 'War Cabinet' is a rather general term and could refer to the War Cabinet with W.C. and the other people at the top, or any of the many Committees under the W.C.

Now I believe it was you who posted the attached paper. It seems to mention some kind of problems with tanker allocation. This sounds familiar from Morgan and Shacklady isn't it?

It also says: 'certain Fighter and Bomber squadrons should begin the use of 100 octane fuel'

and

'removal DDT 230 (ie. 87 octane - my note) fuel from Bomber and Fighter Command stations where 100 octane fuel is being bought into use'.

This hardly sounds as univeral use, David. In fact, it quite clearly says that there were to be selected Fighter and Bomber bases where 100 octane fuel was to be used. On another page they specifically say 'no' to Bomber Command's demands to have only 100 octane fuel on Bomber Stations on economical grounds (100 octane was more expensive, and Britain was running out of cash), save the 4 BC Stations mentioned.

Of course I haven't seen all the series of these papers. It would be nice to see them for all I guess. But since these and all subsequent papers I have mention 'stations concerned', the 'fighter units concenred' I have no reason to believe other that the high octane fuel was always meant to be supplied to select stations, while the others kept operated on the standard fuel of the RAF - 87 octane.