Just curious about the P-51 FM

[horseback]

I disagree. Numerical superiority helps even in smaller battles. Even an 10:9 superiority means 1 pilot out of ten can engage the enemy at will. And if the LW managed to get 300 planes in the air to engage the bombers and say 100 P-51, then it looks like a huge numerical superiority for the LW, but may in fact have been 100 P-51 against 30 LW planes and this ten times.

Your 100 Mustangs engaging 10 consecutive 30 plane attacks would lead to a certain amount of wastage; aircraft would be lost, some would expend too much fuel or ammo and have to RTB, and some would get separated from the main body and not be able to rejoin. By the time the 10th group of 30 LW fighters arrived, they would be facing a seriously depleted escort, even had the Mustangs managed to destroy or disperse the previous 270 fighters.

The LW had radar plots & aircraft shadowing the bombers from the North sea onwards as they headed to their targets; they systematically kept track of each bomber formation’s altitude, course and speed, where the escorts were most heavily concentrated and tried to calculate how soon they were likely to depart or be replaced for the next ‘leg’ by another group of escorts. LW interceptors were kept well-informed of all of this as they waited for takeoff orders and as they climbed to position for their attacks.

The whole point of these practices was to ensure numerical superiority at the point of attack, and as a practical matter, they were often successful. But even if they were successful, an aggressive escort positioned in the right place could break up an attack and inflict disproportionate casualties. The sky is a big place and you cannot keep track of everything. There is the glare of the sun, contrails, clouds and sheer distance to contend with. The 8th Fighter Command had some very good minds who worked very hard at coming up with new ways to vary courses and schedules to throw the Germans off the scent, but most of the time, it mainly came down to the escort being in position for the bounce and being better than the opposition.

cheers

horseback

[horseback]

The Luftwaffe of early 43 was good. But the decline in quality and quantity of pilots and material was rapid and by mid 44 the LW was only a shadow of its past glory. By end of 43, when P-51s came into the theater the RAF and P-47s had made quite some dents into LW.

I love this recurring meme; the poor jagdewaffe in the West being run ragged by huge numbers of Spitfires and P-47s nibbling at the fringes of European airspace and fighting desperately to stem the tide of thousands of B-17s and B-24s that were striking at Germany itself and implying that this was the case immediately after the United States entered the war.

I’m not familiar with the numbers of Spits on the Channel, but the best figures I can get for their reach is about 90 miles (145 km) past the French coast, and that was only in certain areas where France and England were fairly close. In terms of attrition, they were a minor concern to the LW; they could largely be avoided or ignored. A P-47C/D with a single belly tank (the twin wing pylons of the late D models didn’t become available until late spring of 1944) could have an effective combat range out to the edges of German airspace, and it took the USAAF about six months to develop that capability after the P-47 was introduced to operations (March, 1943).

The P-47 was introduced early spring of 1943 and it was still a developmental aircraft in many ways; mechanical and radio aborts were fairly common well into the fall of that year, and it was quickly established that the Thunderbolt was not competitive at altitudes below 20,000 ft. Additionally, of the three 8th AF fighter groups, only the 56th FG had had any previous time in the type; the more combat seasoned 4th FG had previously flown Spitfires under British control and the 78th was stripped of its P-38s and most of its pilots to supply the Torch/N. African campaign—it was mainly a shell of senior officers and newly trained pilots dropped into modern fighters right out of the gate. The 4th lost a good number of experienced pilots and leaders who were sent to other AAF units to provide combat experience and leadership (and dilute the RAF mindset they had). Basically, two of the three fighter groups in England started operations in the P-47 already resentful and shorthanded.

For most of the summer and early fall of 1943, these three groups of roughly 45 aircraft each could field a maximum effort of maybe 110-120 fighters to escort (in shifts) a fairly limited number of B-17s over (mainly) France, and they were getting their asses kicked. The Germans were destroying aircraft and killing or capturing trained aircrew about as quickly as we could build or train them & get them across the Atlantic most of that year. In the case of bombers and crews they were taking them out even faster than (less experienced) new ones could be brought in for most of 1943.

In fact, there was a great deal of discussion of at least suspending the daylight bombing effort entirely by mid-October of that year, in order to finally gather up a big enough force to overwhelm the German defenses (although without effective fighter escorts past the German border, it might have simply led to even greater losses to no benefit). During that fall and early winter of 1943, about five or six new fighter groups joined the 8th AF, but their participation in combat operations were limited by the ‘breaking in period’ required partly because production of USAAF first-line fighters had not reached the point where they could be used for advanced training, which meant that the first time the newly trained pilots actually got meaningful time in the fighter model they would be fighting in was after they had arrived in England and partly because they still had to be trained and briefed on the latest tactics and radio procedures in the theater.

That breaking in period was extended by truly atrocious weather that fall, which slowed their progress and led to several fatalities in training while the original three groups not only continued their combat operations, but ‘loaned’ key personnel to the new groups to train and evaluate them.
8th AF combat operations during the period from mid-October ’43 until mid-February of ’44 were spotty and erratic due to the weather and the ongoing debate about which direction the bombing campaign would take; Escort To Berlin, the combat diary of the 4th FG, shows just over 40 missions for the group (often squadron sized or less) during that 123 day period, making contact less than half the time, and barely breaking even in terms of victories and combat losses (add in operational casualties, and they were losing, and badly). Only the 56th FG was enjoying a measure of success at that time; the 78th and the 4th were probably still sulking over being stuck with the P-47 and all the key personnel they’d had stolen from them to stock other groups in England, Italy and the Pacific.

Meanwhile, the poor LW was busily patting itself on the back and painting victory bars and pictures of Iron Crosses on their tail fins, ignoring the fact that the Battle of the Atlantic had been lost by the U-boats and that now the steadily increasing production of the US factories and training bases could be brought to England without losing a meaningful percentage first. They thought that they had already won the Battle of Germany, and their leadership simply didn’t believe that reports of the P-51 equipped with a Merlin 60 series engine could a) have the range to escort the bombers over Germany or b) be effective even if it did. Morale at Christmas of 1943 was very good, and confidence was high. Most fighter pilots were more concerned about what Goerring might do to them than what the Americans would do.

Certainly there had been some attrition, but they were winning and doing so easily. There had been sightings of P-38s, but these were poorly flown by half-frozen, half-trained pilots in limited numbers, and the Lightning was never well thought of by the pilots of the Luftwaffe unless they were shot down or nearly got shot down by one (and some not even then, like Galland). It had good range, but it was a twin, and it was an article of faith that twins couldn’t compete with single engine fighters. The P-47 was sometimes dangerous up high, but it was short legged and useless below 6500m, where any extended fight was likely to end.

A German fighter pilot stationed in the West at the end of 1943 was well trained, well rested and confidant; he had more combat experience, proven leaders in every unit, excellent aircraft, reliable weapons, good tactical doctrine, and an extensive early warning and ground control system. He probably would have thought himself in a better position than the Tommies were over southern England in the summer of 1940. There were lots of Tommies and Americans, it was true, but they could be avoided most of the time and once the bombers got past the French border, they were alone and practically sitting ducks. More victory bars and fancier medals for the tail fin display were on the horizon, and once they finally learned that the Fatherland was not to be trifled with, they would come to terms with Germany and maybe even join in on the destruction of the Soviet Union.

That's both sides of the story; 1943 was a very good year to be a German fighter pilot, and most of them thought that there was no end in sight for their continued dominance over their own airspace. At the start of 1944, the Germans were convinced that they had everything well in hand in the West. They certainly made no efforts to increase training schedules or the number of fighter units in the West until the situation became a crises.

cheers

horseback

[JtD]

Originally Posted by horseback

Certainly there had been some attrition, but they were winning and doing so easily.

Since 1939, until the end of 1943, the fighter arm of the Luftwaffe had suffered about 800% losses, meaning every unit was completely wiped out and replaced 8 times. About 3 times in 1943 alone. Pilot losses were nearly half of that.

[horseback]

Originally Posted by JtD

Since 1939, until the end of 1943, the fighter arm of the Luftwaffe had suffered about 800% losses, meaning every unit was completely wiped out and replaced 8 times. About 3 times in 1943 alone. Pilot losses were nearly half of that.

That sort of attrition was standard for combat groups in WWII, even against inferior opposition. US fighter groups in the Pacific, like the 49th FG in New Guinea and several USMC squadrons operating in the Solomons during 1942-44 had very comparable turnover rates under much more physically demanding conditions. Combat infantry outfits in the same constant pace of operations underwent a far higher turnover.

What you ignore is that the LW was able to replace those men at those rates and still dominate; what they couldn't handle was the way the rate of loss sharply increased in the first three months of 1944, when the Mustang was first introduced in the very places where the greatest losses were inflicted.

You can continue to insist that it's just a coincidence, and that they just won some sort of numbers game, but if the numbers change like that, I must maintain that the change in fortunes was earned by the P-51 groups and lost by the FW 190 and Bf 109 outfits at a time when the Mustangs were at a numerical disadvantage.

The average Mustang pilot flew much farther under more stressful conditions for much longer just to get to where he could do his real job. If the Germans, with foreknowledge of where the bombers and escorts were likely to be, greater combat experience and superior numbers couldn't get the job done in those critical months, maybe some credit should go to the men and aircraft that were successful.

cheers

horseback

[JtD]

You can continue to insist...

I haven't even started insisting on anything. So leave your polemics out and try to argue the points I make, not invent some on your own and then go on to debate them with yourself.

You made the claim that the Luftwaffe was "easily winning" the air war in the west until the appearance of the P-51. That's simply not true. You're of course free to insist, but you won't change facts.

[horseback]

Originally Posted by JtD

I haven't even started insisting on anything. So leave your polemics out and try to argue the points I make, not invent some on your own and then go on to debate them with yourself.

You made the claim that the Luftwaffe was "easily winning" the air war in the west until the appearance of the P-51. That's simply not true. You're of course free to insist, but you won't change facts.

From Wikipedia: A polemic /pəˈlɛmɪk/ is a contentious argument that is intended to establish the truth of a specific understanding and the falsity of the contrary position. Polemics are mostly seen in arguments about very controversial topics.

The art or practice of such argumentation is called polemics.

Along with debate, polemics are one of the most common forms of arguing. Similar to debate, a polemic is confined to a definite controversial thesis. But unlike debate, which may allow for common ground between the two disputants, a polemic is intended only to establish the truth of a point of view while refuting the opposing point of view.

I re-read the definition, to be sure that we are on the same page. I do not understand why engaging in a polemic argument is bad, if we are dealing with a situation where if one of us is right, the other must be wrong.

Your contention that the LW’s fighter arm suffered 800% casualties ignores the situation in the West or more specifically, the part of the West where the Mustang was exclusively engaged for the first six months of its combat operations, the Channel Front and specifically against the Reich Defense. You imply that 800% casualties for the jagdewaffe as a whole over a 39 month period applies evenly across all fronts, and that the Allies on the Channel were just as successful in their operational aims across the Channel and over Germany as the Soviets over Kursk or the Desert Air Force and the 12th/15th Air Forces over Italy and the Mediterranean, and that the Luftwaffe was on the run everywhere, men and machines were at the end of their ropes and they were on the verge of collapse in the face of triumphant Allied forces. Not so.

Several heavy bomber groups in the 8th Air force suffered well over 300% casualties during 1943, and when you lost a bomber over Germany or occupied Europe, you weren’t getting any of those men back, dead or alive. There were several occasions where individual bomb groups or squadrons lost more than half their strength in a single sortie that year, and there was at least one group that got hit that hard more than a couple of times. The only reason the three fighter groups in the 8th AF didn’t take similar casualties is because the German fighter command avoided them (HUGE mistake, IMHO—if I had been running the operation, the P-47 units would have been beaten like red-headed stepchildren at every opportunity to keep them in the proper frame of mind—scared and eager to avoid me and leaving the bombers unprotected for the ZGs and JGs in Germany) through most of the summer and fall of ’43. The Army Air Forces suffered a higher loss rate than the Infantry for most of that war, and 8th Bomber Command took the lion’s share of those losses, both operational and due to enemy action (and the sheer bloody-mindedness of Ira Eaker).

It is a fact that many if not most ground based USAAF and Navy/Marine fighter units in the first two and half years of the Pacific war took higher losses than the JGs and ZGs along the Channel Front and over Germany from 1940 to 1943; they lost men to disease, operational accidents (guys who ‘safely’ ditched right next to friendly ships were still lost about a fifth of the time, never mind the ones who got lost over the ocean or some jungle) as well as to enemy action. There is hardly a single veteran of those campaigns who did not suffer from malaria the rest of his life (right off the top of my head, I can think of three top aces who were forced to leave combat at the peak of their powers because of tropical diseases).

Similarly, ground combat units in every combatant army were suffering at least as high a casualty rate.

The greatest health problem the jagdewaffe had while staying in France, Holland and Belgium was apparently venereal disease. Yes, they were taking losses from enemy action, but they were inflicting much greater losses on the RAF and the USAAF and they knew it quite well. According to Caldwell in his Top Guns of the Luftwaffe homage to JG 26, 43/44 was not that much different than the previous winter until ‘Big Week’ in February of ’44, and morale, particularly in the German-based units who never saw enemy fighters was high.

If they were in trouble, they didn’t know it and neither did the folks on the other side. Only hindsight allows you or anyone else to suggest that it was inevitable. I don’t think that it was entirely; if the Mustang was only as successful as the P-38s in the 8th AF, we have to wait for all of the P-47s to get the improved wider props and the increased fuel capacity from the wing pylons before air superiority over Europe is established, which sets the Allies back by at least three or four months.

The injection of first, just fifty Mustangs able to reach over Germany in December ‘43, then fifty more in January, and then another hundred or so over February and March just blows all of that to hell. The P-47s and Spitfires are reaching no farther than they did in October, and the P-38 group is suffering high abort rates and scoring at a lower pace than the P-47 groups. The serious losses to the Jagdewaffe were taking place over the Franco-German border and Germany itself, where only Mustangs can reach.

Those are established historical facts. Could an aircraft as twitchy, trim sensitive and unstable as the in-game Mustang have fared as well in those conditions if the Bf 109Gs and FW 190As depicted in the game were directly comparable to their real-life counterparts?

Please note that I leave out the spurious performance of the rear gunners of the in-game Bf 110Gs and the other twins out of pure Christian charity.

cheers

horseback

[Mustang]

Chronicling the history and development of the P-51 Mustang through a timeline


http://p51h.home.comcast.net/~p51h/time/time.htm

[horseback]

The LWs tactics were not optimised to keep the fighter losses//Mustang kill ratio low. They tried to shoot down as many bombers as they could, and most of the time did so by throwing fighters in small portions at the bomber stream. And their intended target were the bombers.

And besides that - if the enemy manages to carry the fight to your homeland, than you are at a severe tactical disadvantage -you can not act, you react.

Again, there is a false chronology: There were less than 200 Mustangs operational in England to be used as bomber escorts from December 1943 until mid-April, 1944, during which the zerstörer Gruppe were largely massacred, and the jagdewaffe suffered its greatest attrition over Germany; that means that the majority of experienced leaders and pilots lost were lost to Mustangs flown by mainly grass-green pilots (three of the first four Mustang groups didn’t fly a Merlin Mustang until they arrived in England less than two bad flying weather months before entering combat), however well trained. The single engine fighters were there to mop up after the zerstörer units, and if there were fighter escorts to deal with them.

They had no business fixating on bombers until after the zerstörer gruppe had been rendered hors de combat by the end of March, and some of their number were reassigned to carry heavy cannon pods and rocket tubes to break up the bomber formations. At no time during this period were the German single engine fighters outnumbered over Germany by the fighter escorts. At best, they were misdirected or just couldn't get the job done.

As I have repeatedly pointed out before, that means that either the Mustang was an exceptional fighter in nearly every way, or most of the men in their cockpits were sons of Krypton flying incognito.

The Pony in Il-2 is fine (maybe except for the trim requirements). It is FAST. In a shallow climb or dive you outrun almost anything. And it keeps its speed if you don't hamfist it. At speeds where a P-40 would start losing parts it is stable like a brick. It climbs reasonably well and accelerates okay.
It has endurance a Bf-109 will never achive. It can carry a useful load of ordinance, or even more fuel. Now if I only could hit anything while flying it...

Except for the trim requirements? In this game, that level of endurance, even on the biggest maps, is unnecessary to the point of parody. Speed and endurance are next to useless to a fighter that cannot be kept under control, and if you can't aim your guns accurately, it can't be called 'stable', like a brick or anything else. I would argue that the whole point of the trim requirements (and a COG more consistent with an overload fuel capacity) is to keep you from hitting anything when you fly with it.

'Nuff said.

cheers

horseback

[majorfailure]

Originally Posted by horseback

Except for the trim requirements? In this game, that level of endurance, even on the biggest maps, is unnecessary to the point of parody. Speed and endurance are next to useless to a fighter that cannot be kept under control, and if you can't aim your guns accurately, it can't be called 'stable', like a brick or anything else. I would argue that the whole point of the trim requirements (and a COG more consistent with an overload fuel capacity) is to keep you from hitting anything when you fly with it.

'Nuff said.

cheers

horseback

Speed gives you the ability to enter and exit a fight at will. No other plane characteristic gives you such a tremendous advantage IMHO.

And endurance gives you the ability to fight as long as you want - or to leave the fight, reposition, or to fly around known enemy concentrations -and it gives you the ability to get the best aircraft performance for prolonged times - though in IL2 most missions are considerably shorter than real life 4-5 hour missions so endurance is as you said of limited use.

And my aiming problems have little to do with the stability of the P-51, more with usually great closure rates leading to small shot windows -and very largely to not beeing used to flying it.

[horseback]

Originally Posted by majorfailure

Speed gives you the ability to enter and exit a fight at will. No other plane characteristic gives you such a tremendous advantage IMHO.

And endurance gives you the ability to fight as long as you want - or to leave the fight, reposition, or to fly around known enemy concentrations -and it gives you the ability to get the best aircraft performance for prolonged times - though in IL2 most missions are considerably shorter than real life 4-5 hour missions so endurance is as you said of limited use.

And my aiming problems have little to do with the stability of the P-51, more with usually great closure rates leading to small shot windows -and very largely to not beeing used to flying it.

Agree with all but the last point. However, the Mustang with half a fuel load gives you all of that. The idea that you need to fly with anything in that damned fuselage tank is--there are no words for it, but it seems to me that it's like letting the other guy dictate to you that you have to fight with one hand tied behind your back. I find that more often than not, as I am closing on the target I am fighting my stick and sometimes my pedals trying to keep my pipper centered on target while the ball under the sight does its best pinball impression, something I rarely experienced flying a Dora or late model big gunned 109 in other campaigns. Of course, the fifties don't give you that deeply satisfying insta-kill 99.9% of the time either. You must either slow down or make multiple passes.

I have to wonder whether most people decide not to fly the Mustang in-game because it is so much extra work.

cheers

horseback