Request tacticle help for USN planes

[horseback]

Originally Posted by K_Freddie

This is the key to escaping the Zero... Chinnault's Tigers were doing this before Pearl Harbour in P40's... just that back home they didn't know how to read combat reports.

The Zero had limited top speed (around 390 kph) for maneuverability in the rolling axis, where it's ailerons locked due to compressibility. The wing profile that gave it's high maneuverability at low speeds, suddenly had big limitations at high speed.

The Allies learned about this very quickly and used the high speed roll to escape or out-maneuver the Zero.

Freddy, Freddy, Freddy. You are being unfair to people who didn't even have digital watches, much less cell phones and internet porn.

How do you think that combat reports made their way back to the US from Rangoon, and from the US to carriers at sea? (and this is just based on the assumption that detailed reports were made at the time and sent to--most likely--USAAF Headquarters). Back in 1942, there was nothing even remotely like the instant communications we enjoy today; Burma was literally the backside of nowhere, and telegraph was the fastest form of communication available assuming that British commanders on the scene were willing to pass on tactical observations to a foreign power from what they considered a bunch of Yank mercenaries. Chances are that any reports were relayed through the US embassy in Chunking, and hand carried up the chain, again, assuming that the ambassador had the space in his couriers' bags at any given time.

At best, the reports from the pilots and their commander made it back to Washington in a month or two, and then you have to keep in mind that the USAAF was run by the bomber boys who had very little use for Chennault and his fighter doctrines (which was why he had to retire early in the first place). Were it not for the sensationalist press reports, his combat evaluations might never have been read at all.

NONE of the Allies seem to have been reading even their own combat reports in 1941-42; even though some RAF squadrons in England were reportedly flying finger four combat formations in early 1941 across the Channel, other squadrons in the Med and Far East continued to fly vics and strings well into 1943 (and paying the price in blood).

It seems like everyone was forced to figure things out for themselves; the USN's Thach had experimented with formations of two pairs in late fall of 1941 in San Diego based on what almost everyone at the time considered ridiculous reports about Japanese fighters whose performance equaled the best the Western Powers had, and possessed of unGodly maneuverability besides. Apparently, he had the time to kill since he was ashore prepping a new fighter squadron with the F4F-3, which was coming in in dribs and drabs, and had less than ideal performance compared to contemporary land based fighters.

Chennault, whose reports may have been what prompted Thach's experiments, adapted tactics best suited to the Hawk 81s he was expecting from Lend Lease to China. Those tactics wouldn't have worked as well for Wildcats, whose speed and acceleration were less exhilarating than the Hawks', but did possess better forward vision and sufficient maneuverability to take advantage of the deflection shooting that USN aviators trained for.

Meanwhile, in Java and then Northern Australia, the survivors flying P-40Es had learned their lessons the hard way and compared notes. None of these people had an opportunity to learn from each others' experiences until much later in the war if not after. When Chennault's 23rd FG finally got razorback Merlin Mustangs in mid-'44, his guys never got the memo about the guns jamming due to wing flexing, and they never figured out a fix beyond getting the D-models to replace the A/B/C models that never quite replaced the P-40Ms and Ns in China.

The Zero's ailerons got a lot heavier very quickly over 200 kts indicated, but it wasn't compressibility (and the shock waves it produced), it was just the tradeoff for having those big ailerons that worked so well at what the IJN considered combat speeds, below 200kts. At the higher speeds air resistance on those large control surfaces was more pronounced and the leverage you could generate on the stick was not so great, particularly for the much shorter average Japanese of the day. Allied fighters were almost all better in this regard, and since few of them could accelerate like the lighter Japanese models, they were already entering expected combat zones at higher than cruise speeds anyway. The relative advantages of staying fast were soon noted, as you pointed out.

cheers

horseback

[Pursuivant]

Originally Posted by horseback

The proof, as they say, is in the pudding. Most rigorously trained, maybe. Tough? Hell yeah. Best?

Arguably, in terms of victories scored, the top Japanese aces were superior to the top American aces. OTOH, in terms of kill ratios after the first 6-12 months of the war the U.S. mopped the floor with the Japanese in terms of kill ratios.

Your posts - not just the one above - point out some extremely important difference between IJN and IJAAF and American pilots. The Americans had lots of little, intangible differences which came from, essentially, being American. And, I DON'T say that in a jingoistic sense - it's little things like greater population, better diet, more robust manufacturing base and higher levels of personal initiative which was based as much on American culture as U.S. military training.

Additionally, I think that one of the huge things that help destroy Japanese air power is that most Japanese pilots were enlisted men, and ALL Japanese pilots were treated as being fundamentally expendable by their high command. That was reflected in everything from airplane design to quality of survival equipment. Saburo Sakai mentions this in his memoir.

Originally Posted by horseback

The Japanese, flying aircraft superior in every respect excepting dive acceleration and pilot protection, in many cases having years of combat experience, and all quite well-informed of their opponents' aircraft performances vs their own mounts, did not adjust well to changing circumstances and tactical innovations by their opponents and paid the price. Their training had also made them slaves to doctrine.

To be fair, this is because the Japanese were increasingly isolated and had progressively less ability to train due to the changing fortunes of war.

What might have been a factor is that the Japanese had a very authoritarian culture before and during WW2. Even today, in situations where national culture prevents subordinates from pointing out their errors of their superiors, tragedy can ensue. For example, until accident investigators figured this out, Korean airliner pilots had higher levels of accidents. This is because in Korean culture the command pilot is God and the copilot's job is to sit down, shut up and do as he is told.

Again, that's not meant to be any sort of endorsement of the US of A, or any sort of condemnation of any other culture, it's just different. (Also, note that frighteningly authoritarian regimes can encourage tactical innovation in the military. The 3rd Reich, which is the poster child for "evil authoritarian regime" trained its officers to improvise in tactical situations.)

[sniperton]

Originally Posted by Pursuivant

The 3rd Reich, which is the poster child for "evil authoritarian regime" trained its officers to improvise in tactical situations.)

Yeah, but the Luftwaffe was a relatively new establishment with many actual combat pilots in high ranks and having influence on decisions. Göring, Udet, Galland, just to name a few. And with Hitler being more interested in tactical details than in the strategic big picture. The Luftwaffe was more perceptible to the experiences and inventions of individual pilots than the RAF or the IJN. This has more to do with the special sociologic composition of the Luftwaffe than with the authoritarian nature of the Nazi state.

[horseback]

Originally Posted by Pursuivant

Arguably, in terms of victories scored, the top Japanese aces were superior to the top American aces. OTOH, in terms of kill ratios after the first 6-12 months of the war the U.S. mopped the floor with the Japanese in terms of kill ratios.

Your posts - not just the one above - point out some extremely important difference between IJN and IJAAF and American pilots. The Americans had lots of little, intangible differences which came from, essentially, being American. And, I DON'T say that in a jingoistic sense - it's little things like greater population, better diet, more robust manufacturing base and higher levels of personal initiative which was based as much on American culture as U.S. military training.

Additionally, I think that one of the huge things that help destroy Japanese air power is that most Japanese pilots were enlisted men, and ALL Japanese pilots were treated as being fundamentally expendable by their high command. That was reflected in everything from airplane design to quality of survival equipment. Saburo Sakai mentions this in his memoir.

I think that if you pursue the historical record of US losses at a given time and place versus Japanese claims, you will find that the IJN and IJAAF fighter pilots overclaimed much, much more than US or Allied pilots at any given point during the war. All of the Japanese claims are taken at the claimant's word, because there was no formal claims process in the Japanese system comparable to the Allied or even German systems. I think you'll find that at Coral Sea and afterwards, US and Allied losses never remotely matched Japanese claims, and that as the Allied air forces gained experience, their claims ever more closely matched recorded Japanese losses.

This was partly due to the fact that Japanese High Command never developed an intelligence function most other air forces did; most other countries' post-mission procedures included a pilot and or aircrew interview with the intelligence officer (IO)even before making a written report. This squadron or wing IO would then try to corroborate claims, point out conflicts and inconsistencies & then try to clear them up as much as possible before submitting a report listing losses taken and damages inflicted upon the enemy, including any unusual observations, etc. This report was used to develop a picture of what was going on in the air war, not just to keep track of pilots' scores. However, the result was that those pilots who were questioned and crosschecked quickly learned to be better observers and recognize the difference between what could be claimed and what could be treated like hyperbole (and nobody can hyperbolate like an American fighter pilots).

All the Japanese fighter pilots got was positive feedback; their commanders received their optimistic claims enthusiastically, and then acted upon the misconceptions that they gave rise to. Right up to the end of the war, Japanese Admirals and Generals would assume that enemy planes were destroyed, ships sunk and bases wiped from the face of the earth that still existed and threatened their own shrinking supply of aircraft, ships and bases.

Now, about the officer/enlisted distinction, I'm not sure that I can accept that one. Japanese culture was very taken up with the 'noble sacrifice' mentality; captains went down with their ships, generals and admirals died at their posts when the island they were defending was invaded, pilots repeatedly made suicidal decisions like the torpedo squadron commander at Midway who, after locating the US carriers on a recon, met his strike group in the air on the way back and turned around to lead them to the carriers (even though he knew that his position message had gotten through and his aircraft would not have enough fuel to get him back to his carrier after the strike).

The Japanese did not have the sort of mindset that allowed them to say that any one person short of the Emperor was too valuable an asset a waste on a whim, so they lost a great many skilled and specially trained men early in the war that they didn't have to, and went on to sacrifice literally millions right up to the last day of the war. Officers, enlisted, pilots, sailors, soldiers or marines, it didn't matter; you did what you were told to do, you went where you were sent and for heaven's sake, you never even considered questioning higher authority.

If MacArthur had been Japanese, he'd have either stayed on Corrigedor and died fighting to the last man, or he would have returned to Japan only so he could commit hari-kiri on the steps of the Imperial Palace to apologize for his failure. No way would he have been allowed to escape certain defeat and capture/death and then continue on in a command position--it would have been unthinkable and more importantly, unacceptable.

cheers

horseback