Quote:
Originally Posted by JtD
Since 1939, until the end of 1943, the fighter arm of the Luftwaffe had suffered about 800% losses, meaning every unit was completely wiped out and replaced 8 times. About 3 times in 1943 alone. Pilot losses were nearly half of that.
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That sort of attrition was standard for combat groups in WWII, even against inferior opposition. US fighter groups in the Pacific, like the 49th FG in New Guinea and several USMC squadrons operating in the Solomons during 1942-44 had very comparable turnover rates under much more physically demanding conditions. Combat infantry outfits in the same constant pace of operations underwent a far higher turnover.
What you ignore is that the LW was able to replace those men at those rates and still
dominate; what they couldn't handle was the way the rate of loss sharply increased in the first three months of 1944, when the Mustang was first introduced in the very places where the greatest losses were inflicted.
You can continue to insist that it's just a coincidence, and that they just won some sort of numbers game, but if the numbers change like
that, I must maintain that the change in fortunes was
earned by the P-51 groups and
lost by the FW 190 and Bf 109 outfits at a time when the Mustangs were at a numerical disadvantage.
The average Mustang pilot flew much farther under more stressful conditions for much longer just to get to where he could do his real job. If the Germans, with foreknowledge of where the bombers and escorts were likely to be, greater combat experience and superior numbers couldn't get the job done in those critical months, maybe
some credit should go to the men and aircraft that were successful.
cheers
horseback