Quote:
Originally Posted by Pursuivant
Arguably, in terms of victories scored, the top Japanese aces were superior to the top American aces. OTOH, in terms of kill ratios after the first 6-12 months of the war the U.S. mopped the floor with the Japanese in terms of kill ratios.
Your posts - not just the one above - point out some extremely important difference between IJN and IJAAF and American pilots. The Americans had lots of little, intangible differences which came from, essentially, being American. And, I DON'T say that in a jingoistic sense - it's little things like greater population, better diet, more robust manufacturing base and higher levels of personal initiative which was based as much on American culture as U.S. military training.
Additionally, I think that one of the huge things that help destroy Japanese air power is that most Japanese pilots were enlisted men, and ALL Japanese pilots were treated as being fundamentally expendable by their high command. That was reflected in everything from airplane design to quality of survival equipment. Saburo Sakai mentions this in his memoir.
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I think that if you pursue the historical record of US losses at a given time and place versus Japanese claims, you will find that the IJN and IJAAF fighter pilots overclaimed much, much more than US or Allied pilots at any given point during the war. All of the Japanese claims are taken at the claimant's word, because there was no formal claims process in the Japanese system comparable to the Allied or even German systems. I think you'll find that at Coral Sea and afterwards, US and Allied losses never remotely matched Japanese claims, and that as the Allied air forces gained experience, their claims ever more closely matched recorded Japanese losses.
This was partly due to the fact that Japanese High Command never developed an intelligence function most other air forces did; most other countries' post-mission procedures included a pilot and or aircrew interview with the intelligence officer (IO)even before making a written report. This squadron or wing IO would then try to corroborate claims, point out conflicts and inconsistencies & then try to clear them up as much as possible before submitting a report listing losses taken and damages inflicted upon the enemy, including any unusual observations, etc. This report was used to develop a picture of what was going on in the air war, not just to keep track of pilots' scores. However, the result was that those pilots who were questioned and crosschecked quickly learned to be better observers and recognize the difference between what could be claimed and what could be treated like hyperbole (and nobody can hyperbolate like an American fighter pilots).
All the Japanese fighter pilots got was positive feedback; their commanders received their optimistic claims enthusiastically, and then acted upon the misconceptions that they gave rise to. Right up to the end of the war, Japanese Admirals and Generals would assume that enemy planes were destroyed, ships sunk and bases wiped from the face of the earth that still existed and threatened their own shrinking supply of aircraft, ships and bases.
Now, about the officer/enlisted distinction, I'm not sure that I can accept that one. Japanese culture was very taken up with the 'noble sacrifice' mentality; captains went down with their ships, generals and admirals died at their posts when the island they were defending was invaded, pilots repeatedly made suicidal decisions like the torpedo squadron commander at Midway who, after locating the US carriers on a recon, met his strike group in the air on the way back and turned around to lead them to the carriers (even though he knew that his position message had gotten through and his aircraft would not have enough fuel to get him back to his carrier after the strike).
The Japanese did not have the sort of mindset that allowed them to say that any one person short of the Emperor was too valuable an asset a waste on a whim, so they lost a great many skilled and specially trained men early in the war that they didn't have to, and went on to sacrifice literally millions right up to the last day of the war. Officers, enlisted, pilots, sailors, soldiers or marines, it didn't matter; you did what you were told to do, you went where you were sent and for heaven's sake, you never even considered questioning higher authority.
If MacArthur had been Japanese, he'd have either stayed on Corrigedor and died fighting to the last man, or he would have returned to Japan only so he could commit hari-kiri on the steps of the Imperial Palace to apologize for his failure. No way would he have been allowed to escape certain defeat and capture/death and then continue on in a command position--it would have been unthinkable and more importantly,
unacceptable.
cheers
horseback