I was struck by the observation the British made that in the past they had relied too much on a thoretical view, which is exactly what Crumpp has, a theoretical view.
Crumpp has been adivsed of the late 1980's approach to this topic ie that its a blend of theory, handling and an awareness of the mission being undertaken. These more modern standards he has ignored
He keeps saying that the Spitfore broke up easily in a spin which is why it was banned in the Pilots Notes. Unfortunately he has yet to produce one example of such a loss. I should add that I expect there to be a few but the fact that Crumpp has failed to produce one says a lot
Crumpp also says that the Spitfire was prone to structural failure due to stability issues, but so far he has yet to produce one example. Again I should add that I expect there to be a few but the fact that Crumpp has failed to produce one says a lot
He has also made reference to piles of bent wings awaiting repair in the BOB but has yet to find one example
Crumpp has failed to produce any evidence that the level of instability was dangerous. Much is made of the fact that the pilots notes warn of this, rightly, but no comment that the notes worked as proven by the lack of crashes.
No comment has been made has been made that Pilots notes err on the side of caution, we only have a catastrophic reading.
There clearly was a problem with the Mk Vb and bob weights were introduced on operational aircraft until a better solution was found. The evidence is that this was caused by poor loading in the squadrons but it didn't matter the problem had to be solved and it was. Even her Crumpp insists that this was a problem from the start and bob weights were introduced into all early versions of the spitfire. UNfortunately no evidence has been put forward to support this view. INdeed what has been posted is clear that the Mk I and II were not impacted by the problem.
Much is made of the fact that the Spit wasn't a good gun platform, something that is hardly new and that some pilots were afraid to fly it. A contridiction if ever there was one. If the plane was so unstable why did the pilots love it? However he doesn't mentin that in the same document that the pilots loved the aircraft.
The British were so far behind the times apparently re stability and to prove this he uses a pre WW1 document, a time when they didn't know how to deal with a spin?
Crumpp makes much use of this type of statement
It does not require my opinion.
This is all measured and defined by the NACA, the same characteristics appear as warning in the Operating Notes, and are repeated in a flight testing as well as anecdotal evidence.
My suggestion would be to go school and take some aerodynamics classes.
A few observations on this
a)NACA were using a Mk Va, an old aircraft, known to be the one most suseptable to stability problems, one without a crew up to date with the latest rules and regs in the UK. They did their mesurements but even here, they never said that it was a danger, they did say it didn't meet their normal standards but they didn't say it was a danger. If they had thought it was that bad I am confident they would have said so as Americans are not known for holding back unpleasent truths.
b) No one denies that the Spit wasn't perfect which is why the Pilots notes say what they say, but I repeat they always are cautious.
c) Comments about flght testing. I have asked Crumpp often to supply any flight test from any nation (including Germany) who found this aircraft dangerous this question is still outstanding.. I can only conclude that he has no evidence and by saying this he is exagerating his case
d) Going to classes on aerodynamics. Crumpp may or may not have had some training in aerodynamcis, I don't know.
I do know he offerred to debate longitudinal instability by a number of standards. Unfortunately one of these was to do with roll rates for differing types of aircraft and one was to do with the Rules and regulations about ordering spare parts to stop counterfit parts entering aircraft. Again I believe he was trying to exagerate the strength of his position
Above all of this is the lack of accidents. All the issues he talks about are serious safety issues but we have a serious lack of any incidents.
I bring you back to the first point in this posting.
I was struck by the observation the British made that in the past they had relied too much on a thoretical view, which is exactly what Crumpp has, a theoretical view.
Crumpp by not considering the views and experiences of those who flew the aircraft is relying almost totally on a theoretical approach. The standards of the late 1980's emphasise the importance of mixing theory, hands on experience and the task the plane was designed for, by ignoring this he is making the same mistake the British made in the 1920's. The last ones that I used are MIL-STD-1797a but these may have been modified
Last edited by Glider; 08-06-2012 at 10:52 PM.
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