Quote:
Originally Posted by bongodriver
Attacks on Germany's oil production only became more feasible in the latter stages though didn't it?, the Allies had gained enough ground from which to launch these campaigns by then, whereas a general bombing campaign of the German mainland was always possible as it was within range from the UK, the way I see it, and which helps rationalise it for me (because even I agree it all seemed like a waste) is that despite say only 20% of the damage inflicted by the bombing was effective against genuine German production it was really also about tying the Germans up in a defensive role, had the Germans not been forced into self defense they would have much more resource to pour into their offensive campaigns, I didn't get to watch the Stephen Fry documentary...not all of it anyway, but I think recall a mention that much of the bombing campaign was 'requested' by the Russians? for pretty much those reasons.
|
Attacks on Germanys oil production were feasible from 1st. September 1939. It is true that Germanys only source of natural crude oil lay in Rumania, out of the range of bombers for the early years of the war but the large refining and synthetic oil plants were within our range. What we really lacked was any real understanding of the German war economy. In later 1941 and early 1942 it became apparent to the war cabinet that our bomber offensive was failing. The decision was taken, with a good deal of secrecy, to abandon 'precision' attacks on individual industrial targets and go for the area campaign where the targets were the civilian workers of these industrial areas and any actual damage to the industries themselves were seen as a useful by product of the campaign. It must also be remembered that Bomber Harris was not a party to these decisions but was brought in to implement them and to his credit constantly urged the politicians to tell the British public the unabashed truth behind the strategic bombing campaign.
The Russians constantly demanded a second front in Western Europe. Whilst Stalin seems to have enjoyed the books of allied photo-recon of bomb damaged German cities that Churchill constantly sent him he was well aware that only armies on the ground could defeat Germany.
Churchill used the SBC as a way of delaying a second front in western Europe for as long as he possibly could in the face of Russian and American demands to get on with an amphibious invasion of France. Both Churchill and his Chief of the Imperial General Staff Alanbrooke had a very healthy respect for the fighting power and tenacity of the Wermacht born from their experiences of the first world war. They were much more content (luckily for us) to let the Germans and Russians bleed themselves dry on the eastern front before committing our scant resources of men and material to an all out assualt on the European mainland once more.