[Glider]

Personally I am still waiting for a common sense reply to my previous quite simple and obvious questions. Crumpp responce (as they were not replies) can be summed up as follows :-

a) a shortage of fuel
If there was no shortage then there would be no need to reduce the roll out
There was apparantly a shortage in 1944 and was mentioned by the Allied Oil Committee meetigs Unfortunately we are talking about 1940 not 1944 and the Allied Oil Committee had nothing to do with the BOB. So I am still waiting for any sign of a shortage in the BOB

b) of 16 squadrons
Which squadrons or if you go down the it was 16 squadrons at any one time
All I got was a ticking off for lowering the credibility of the thread and a comment about a pre war paper. Crumpp puts himself forward as an expert on Logistics and would presumably agree that if you have a target to supply 16 FC squadrons, you need to decide where to send the fuel. All I and others have asked him is, Which 16 squadrons

c) of which squadrons or bases
This brings the difficult questions
i) If 100 octane was in short supply when did Drem a small satellite station in Scotland have 100 octane when the priority stations in the South East didn't
ii) At one point in the BOB Duxford had the big wing of five squadrons. Are you really saying that almost a fifth of the RAF supply was in one 12 group station?.
These are I think logical questions. If there was a shortage then did these decisions make sense?. Putting his Logistical hat on again if the theory is that only 16 squadrons used 100 octane at any one time then someone had to decide which stations had the fuel, all I am asking is which stations? also who made the decision?

d) why this isn't mentioned in any official document, book, history
Simple request, why in the most documented air battle in history has no one picked this important factor up. Support your theory with some supporting documentation, not an off the wall conspiracy theory
Again no attempt to adress the question which was quite clear. The best he came up with was establishment vs strength where his definiton is wrong, and a lecture that adaquate supplies had to be at a station before they can use it, something I agree with. The problem is that he ignores later papers saying supplies are adaquate and the roll out can commence.

e) of the process in delivering the fuel
As there is no mention of a any limitation in the distribution of 100 octane fuel in the Oil Committee papers who distributed it

Again a complete failure to reply to the question. As a logistic expert I am sure Crumpp will agree that having decided to issue the fuel you need to agree how to deploy it.The Oil COpmmittee were responsible for the purchase, storage and distribution of fuel. There is no mention of any distribution to FC after May 1940, anywhere. As they didn't do any further distirbution of fuel after May 1940, then as a Logistic expert he must be interested in who did?
I did get a lecture about Units concerned. Its my belief that units concerned means the units that hadn't already been converted. I admit the evidence isn't 100% airtight but
We have the authority to proceed in Dec 1939,
We have papers from Dec 1939 saying which stations should be issued with the fuel In the First Instance,
We know that at the time (Dec 1939) this was for all stations equipped and going to be equipped with Hurricanes and Spitfires.
We know that delivery is prioritised as being operational units and that training units will not get 100 Octane
We know how the fuel was to be distributed, ie as 87 Octane was used up it would be replaced by 100 octane.
We know that in addition to those stations identified in December as being first instance it was used in France and Norway.
We know it started to be used in combat in February.
We know that there was a request in March for Blenhiems and fighters to use 100 Octane.
We know that All No 2 Group were issued with 100 Octane and we know that the process for delivery to FC changed to actively removing it from FC stations speeding up the roll out for those stations.
We know that in May 1940 the Oil Committee considered that change of FC to 100 octane to be complete.


Putting the Logistical Hat on again its interesting to look at the Basic Logistical details we know for the two cases
For the roll out to FC we know
a) Who made the decision
b) That testing was complete in 1939
c) Which stations were to have it issued to IN THE FIRST INSTANCE
d) How it was to be rolled out
e) That the Oil Committee considered the roll out to be complete in May
Note - all the above is supported by official original records held in the NA

For the 16 FC squadrons + 2 Bomber squadrons
a) We don't know who made the decision to continue with this program once war started
b) We don't know that phase IV testing was on going in 1940
c) We don't know which squadrons or which stations were supposed to have the 100 Octane
d) We don't know how it was to be rolled out
e) If this theory is correct, We don't know when the rest of FC had 100 Octane issued
f) We do know that the limit of 2 squadrons of Bombers mentioned in this paper was disregarded, which must question why the fighter limit is supposed to be maintained
None of these is supported by original papers. The best that can be said is that they depend on wild interpretations of some documents while ignoring others

As I said at the start the case for 100% roll out isn't perfect, but its a lot stronger than the case for 16 Fighter squadrons and 2 bomber squadrons