Quote:
Originally Posted by *Buzzsaw*
Rather than make aspersions, I would suggest you actually do some research.
Start with 'Sealion' by Richard Cox, and look for other sources which detail the German plans.
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Let me start with "I don't believe that Germany won the Battle of Britain", for those requiring a simple answer. I wonder how many of the "revisionist screamers" actually read Lt Col Lund's article which was referenced in the linked article. For those who missed the link, or did not read it, here it is:
http://funsite.unc.edu/hyperwar/ETO/BOB/BoB-German/
Remember that this is a USAF Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course, written by a United States Air Force Officer. It disturbs me to see my own countrymen accuse their own Military analysts and Officers of being "revisionist". That's usually internet speak for "Traitor". I think that's what is meant, but I could be wrong.
For Britain it turned out to be a Strategic victory. For Germany, on the other hand, it was an Operational defeat. Both of these conditions, however clear in the 20/20 of hindsight, could very well have turned differently, based upon Hitler's decision making AFTER the fall of 1940. The German decisions which followed are best viewed as Strategic mistakes, lead by an emboldened Hitler, most namely the invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece, the expedition into North Africa and the maddeningly idiotic invasion of Russia. Had Hitler simply left Mussolini to bear the burden of his mistakes early-on, the war would certainly have gone differently. But of course, this was one of the most fatal flaws in the "Little Corporals" strategic decision making. He was simply unable to focus on a few critical objectives for too long. He was constantly changing his mind and adding objectives.
I think that the point of the original poster was to present the differing perspectives from which the same outcome can be viewed. Hitler, Goering, Von Rundstedt, Raeder, Student - for example - had differing purposes, priorities and expectations concerning both the realistic goals of Operation Sea Lion and it's viability.
The assumption presented by some seems to be that since there was a plan for Seelowe, the Germany was 100% committed to it. This is only true with respect to the Luftwaffe. Hitler had other things on his mind, Student knew he could not drop troops after June, Raeder knew that he did not have anywhere near the forces to even partially complete his tasking. Von Runstedt knew that the opportunity of taking England by the Heer, was probably lost at Dunkirk and certainly lost within a three week period after it. Only the idiot Goering, believed that he could accomplish his mission, which he executed poorly - making three disastrous assumptions (that his fighter pilots had no bravery, that he had enough strike capability, and that those tall metal towers on the coast were communications antennae) and at least one completely bone-headed co-decision (with Hitler, to switch from military to civilian targets).
I would suggest Sir B.H. Liddell-Hart's interviews with captured German decision makers, leaders and other witnesses, documented in "The Other Side of the Hill" (UK Edition) and "German Generals Talk (condensed US Edition)" - first published in 1948 as a reference. Particularly pages 144 to 153 in the U.S. Edition.
"Hitler's Generals" - edited by Correlli Barnett is also an excellent book which documents much of what is known and understood about Hitler's reluctance to fully "kick off" Operation Sea Lion. Based upon the statements of Von Rundstedt, members of his staff including Blumentritt, the actual history goes like this - After allowing the BEF to escape at Dunkirk, Hitler fully expected to work out a "deal" with Britain. No matter what we may think about the prospects of Hitler's expectation - that was his objective in stopping 5 German Divisions from closing the encircled BEF BEFORE the BEF hardened defensive positions at Dunkirk and ultimately evacuated the brunt of their forces, back to Britain.
Some of the arguments and conclusions drawn in this thread are over-simplified, one dimensional and limited in scope. Without studying the German side in detail - you simply cannot grasp the complexity and ever changing nature of strategic decision-making as effected by Hitler.
For example, the argument that the British success in the Air Defense of the home Island started a chain reaction that forced Hitler to invade Yugoslavia is absurd. The poster of that silly conclusion needs to examine the Balkans campaign in it's entirety. I know it's complicated but, alas those details, which have no relationship to the Battle of Britain, are essential in forming an opinion.
In summary, the overarching point to this entire subject can best be summarized as follows:
The Battle of Britain was a fight for the British Home Islands, which if lost, would have had horrific consequences, and resulted in a strategic loss of the greatest magnitude. The British public, leadership and military was completely aware of what these air battles meant - the awareness driven home by falling bombs and visible death and destruction of civilian areas.
For Germany, it was a failed excursion - almost unknown to the public - and militarily a limited defeat. The failure of Seelowe barely made a dent in the next two years of Hitler's horrific expansion. The actual forces committed to the defense of France, after the fall of 1940 were minimal. Two Jagdgeswader were able to hold off and maul the next two years of RAF efforts into France, while minimal ground forces were actually required in defense. Only when the USAAF came to full operational capability, adding it's forces to the RAF - did the tides start to turn.
S~
Gunny