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Originally Posted by Glider
Kurfurst
Can I point out one rather large significant problem in the paper that you quote the the use of Captured Fuel in the Luftwaffe during the BOB
The Paper Gavin quotes is :-
direct you to Document file number 043697, in the BP Archive at Warwick University, and specifically to 'Petroleum Board Enemy Oils & Fuels Committee. A Survey of the Results Obtained to Date in the Examination of Enemy Fuel Samples', by D. A. Howes, dated 4 November 1940. This used fuel samples taken from 29 crashed Luftwaffe aircraft between November 1939 and September 1940, and, exclusive of one sample of captured British 100-octane, revealed octane ratings which varied between 87.5 and 92.2 octane. The results were summarised by H. E. Snow to Sir William Fraser on 13 November 1940 as follows (and I quote from the original document):
'No general indication [of] iso-octane or other synthetics. The only 100 octane fuel identified was definitely captured British.'
Gavins reference Paper covers November 1939 to September 1940 and was produced in Nov 1940
Your paper covers the period Summer 1940 to Autumn 1943
They are different Papers. If you are going to comment on someones work, at least get the right paper.
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They are not different papers. They are subsequent reports in the same trail of papers, prepared by the same men, working for the Enemy Oils & Fuels Committee.
The report quoted by 'gbailey' deals only with German 87 octane fuel samples, and the subsequent papers deal with German 100 octane fuel samples. But they are prepared by the same people - D. A. Howes of Anglo American Oil for example is listed just the same in samples I have posted - in the same format, and follow each other in the files, and reference to the other reports, so its very hard to miss the fact that you are not looking at the whole paper.
Of course if you are set out to prove that the American contribution of high octane aviation fuel was not significant, and the Brits could do it all by themselves, you might also want to 'prove', by omitting otherwise available information that those poor Germans had to do with whatever British 100 octane stock they could find.
Of course such views become very comical, when you know that Germany was producing domestically all its 100 octane needs, while Britain was importing it or later given by Lend-Lease, and in fact that British desire in 1938 for 100 octane was fueled by fear that German synthetic plans could essentially produce as much 100 octane as they wanted, and Britain did not want to be left behind in the technology race.
Either its quite simply intellectually dishonest to say the Germans had nothing else but 87 octane fuel, and relied on captured British 100 octane stock, because a report on German 87 octane fuel samples - surprise surprise! - lists only 87 octane fuel samples and one British 100 octane sample. Especially when the next report in the pile of papers says that German 100 octane fuel samples were found in 110s, 88s etc. in the same period.
That may even be a honest mistake, but in that case the 'research' was very superficial and amateurish.
Either case, whoever he is, his opinion is sadly mistaken and instead of addressing it and admitting the mistakes, he resorts to incivility and thin verbal diarrhea.
I would also like to know your version. Do you believe the Germans did not use 100 octane in the Battle of Britain? Do you believe that the only 100 octane they had access to was captured British stocks?
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To try and compare fuel consumption i n the BOB to the situation in 1944 is comparing Pears and Bananas, the planes were different, they had bigger tanks, drop tanks were used. But you know this its a tactic you have tried before. We are talking about the BOB so stick with it.
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Well, again 25 (was it 30 with XIVs..?) Squadrons of Spitfires in 1945 required 15 000 tons of avgas per month. Their tanks were the same size, their sortie times were again pretty much the same lenght as those of 1940.
But let's forget about the 2nd TAF. I've just found a rather interesting table which shows the ratio of combat hours and non-operational hours flown by a plane sorties/time for planes on hand with combat units (i.e. the ones in OTU, storage, manufacturer's flight testing is not included) in mid-1943.
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/Tom%2...0Item%201A.pdf
For Spitfires in NW Africa, an average of 13.2 combat sorties were flown per plane per month, the average combat hours flown per month per plane was 18.5 hours, the non-operational hours flown per month per plane was 19.7 hours. Hourly consumption was 49.7 gallons/hour.
The ratio for P-47s in the UK was very similar, it was 16.3 hours per month for combat sorties and 17.3 for non-operational flights.
So combat sorties amounted quite typically to about just 40% of the total consumption. The remaining 60% is non-operational flights in combat units, which none of your calculations take into account, nor the requirements of bomber command's Blenheim Sqns.