Quote:
Originally Posted by Codex
The point missing about the 262 was that Galland saw these aircraft as a means to kill bombers, Hitler wanted them to be bombers so there is a stark difference in tactical thinking. Obviously Hitler got his way and Germany lost. But if Galland had the 1400 or so aircraft ready and they were all configured for interception as Galland had wanted, the allied bomber squads would have not had the success they did in killing off Germany's production when they did, and I stress when they did. By D-Day I personally don't think Germany would have lasted even if they had best aircraft and pilots at their disposal, the numbers against them were just too great, but the 262 would have certainly either slowed or even stopped the bleeding of Germany's war production and prolonged the war.
|
Actually aside from a few key raids the bombing campaigns did little to halt German production. It's almost ironic that the best months of production for Germany were close to the end... in the months leading up to defeat. I don't have the sources readily available but any university library should have the details (that's where I got mine
). What the bombing campaigns did do was tie up valuable resources in defending against them. So I would speculate that even if the 262 was successful in dealing deadly blows to the 8th Air Force operations the Allies would still have won the long term battle as they were holding up resources that could have been used along the Eastern Front in particular.
I think a Luftwaffe victory in the skies over Germany would only serve to redraw the maps of Europe during the latter half of the 20th Century in favour of the Soviet Union.