And of course it would make little sense to stockpile fuel when in the most intense air fighting of the period for the RAF. They would need every chance they could get.

That document does not look altered one bit...not at all, lol.

Of course you can save a fuel you are not consuming at a high rate. They wanted 800,0000 tons on hand before the first operational aircraft used it, remember??

Look at the fuel at the airfields in your first document. 100 Octane is less than 38% of the fuel on hand in June-August.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...mption-bob.jpg

True the red stuff looks altered but the relevant stuff from June looks perfectly legit to me.....tsk tsk Crumpp that was a desparate attempt without even thinking.

Oh anyone wondered why the fuel is listed as 100 octane and 'other grades'?.......it's almost like anything that isn't 100 octane is secondary :rolleyes:

Crumpp.....in the long run it is going to be less embarrassing just to admit you are wrong on this, it takes balls to do it so I won't hold my breath.

What about June '40?

So who was using the 10,000 tons a month, just under 30% of the fuel being consumed by the UK Crumpp?

PS am still waiting for your evidence that May 1941 was the final switch over for FC.

I think its called clutching at straws.....

Here's another copy of the document NZtyphoon shared. Obviously NZtyphoon added the other 100 octane data prior to June 1940, taken from similar War Cabinet documents, to show the trend and build up of 100 octane fuel.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...40-April41.jpg

This can also be obtained from the National Archives at CAB 68/8/36

You being an ex Ranger/SF are in a firefight about to be overrun and have 8 crates of grenades and just pistols for defense. You are not allowed to use the grenades because you need 20 crates of grenades to be on hand before you can use them.

Tell me you wouldn't use the grenades.

With factory-new replacement fighters continually arriving at all airfields from July '40 onwards, I just can't see two sets of fuel bowsers crisscrossing each other in the dispersal area -- a combat zone, no less -- going from fighter to fighter asking "Premium or Regular?" "Do your windshield?" "Check your oil?"

Nope, one fuel only. And no one is putting 87 octane into a 100 octane-rated engine, but there would be no hesitation putting 100 octane into an older 87 octane-rated Merlin. Common sense and expediency rules in a combat zone.

Pass the grenades!

So devs -- give us our 12 lbs boost. This is what it's all about, isn't it?

It is 10,000 tons at the airfields and not in the strategic reserves. It is not 10,000 tons in airplanes.

It represents 3.74% of the aviation fuel from the stock yards, to the railheads, to the airfields for the first year of the war.

Spend some time on an airfield....

That is why placarding is not a choice or option. Any alternative fuels will be specifically listed by specification.

That is by convention and still followed today.

http://www.aflma.hq.af.mil/shared/me...100111-038.pdf

The graphic is titled : TABLE II - CONSUMPTION
It is 10K tons consumed by airplanes.

If I consume a glass of beer, the beer is in my stomach, not still in the glass.

That straw is getting awfully short Crumpp

LoL, I've pressed you to supply details of even a single 87 octane RAF FC sortie, during the BofB and you can't do it.

Your credibility has been destroyed.

Why not go away and come back when you find evidence for 87 octane use, or are when you ready to man up and admit that you are wrong.

100% 100 octane use = no evidence for 87 octane because it wasn't used.

And the next month's consumption?


:-P

10,000 tons = 3,150,000 imperial gallons consumed per month June-August

Here are the documents which show the cumulative fuel stocks from which the figures in red are taken:

17th Weekly Oil Position Report Dec 31 1939:

http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...9-page-004.jpg

24th WOPR
http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...0-page-006.jpg

25th WOPR 28 Feb 1940

http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...9-page-008.jpg

28th WOPR 17 Mar 1940
http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...0-page-008.jpg

33rd WOPR 23 April 1940
http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...0-page-006.jpg

Note also how much 100 Octane fuel is being stocked outside of Britain ie; West of Suez - the only other active war theatre was France and, later Norway.

And the reasons why Crumpp's reasoning that stocks of 800,000 tons was required, based on pre-war plans, is so erroneous (Oil HMSO Payton-Smith)

http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...9100Octane.jpg

http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...anerevised.jpg

http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...toragecopy.jpg

The pre-war plans were based on an assumption that American supplies would be withheld and that losses due to air attack would be heavy. Using pre-war plans to decide what happened in wartime is a waste of time; as is obvious here, those plans for stocks of 800,000 tons were not realised even two years into the war:

http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...1-page-006.jpg

Also note that stocks of 100 Octane v Other Grades reached near parity in May 1940 294,000 tons v 298,000 tons, and by August, when permission was given to use 100 Octane in all commands, it was the dominant fuel.

Prove it by providing one single WW2 RAF or Air Ministry document which says that the fuel was merely kept at airfields and not consumed. By the same reasoning it could be argued that the RAF didn't consume "Other Grades" of fuel either, which makes one wonder what was used instead of aviation fuel?

And you think that all military airfields stock 5 different types of fuel? You would be full of ****. Your base is stocked with what is required for the A/C that you operate. Not, repeat, not what might land there. If someone needs Jet A instead of JP they stop and a civilian airport and fuel there.

NZtyphoon, great post:!:

As has been mentioned the form is titled CONSUMPTION.

If we follow your logic the 26,000 tons of 87 octane consumed wasn't consumed either, it was also at the airfields. So the next question would be, what were the RAF consuming ( sorry, would you prefer burning up, using, please tell us what term you would prefer)
I would love to see you support that view. Following up this logic each month over this period a further 10,000 tons of 100 Octane and 26,000 tons of 87 octane weere also piling up at the airfields. Where did they put it all and more intrestingly what did they use in the aircraft?

I have spent a lot of time on airfields and the longer this goes on, I suspect that I have spent a lot more time than you on an airfield.

What exactly have this got to do with a chart showing the fuel consumed per month in the UK?

PS still waiting for you to say where you got the information re the full transfer of FC to 100 octane completing in May 1941.
If you do not support that statement can you give one good reason as to why we shouldn't ignore every other statement that you have made without support.

In the strategic reserve but that says nothing about operational use. Looking at supply side evidience does not answer operational question.

Once again, I have not seen a thing that overrides the operational doucmentation or what the Notes on a Merlin Engine say for the specified fuel. When 100 Octane becomes the norm, Notes on a Merlin engine relects it.

You guys are all in a frenzy and foaming at the mouth to disprove the fact the Battle of Britain was transitional time period and we need to have more information.

Un.....be.....lieveable!

Priceless, you have seen the stocks reports = reserves and the consumption reports = operational side.

And the questions are not awnsered what fuel did the RAF use if it wasn't the fuel consumed?

We have been over it before Glider.

I know what it means it terms of strategic logistics. Because you don't accept it does not make it not true or invalid.

Once again, you are all trying really hard to disprove the fact the Battle of Britain was transitional time period and we need to have more information.

There is not any new developments and you are all posting the same old logistical documentation like it is new or changes the picture.

I guess you're blind then...:rolleyes: as I have repeatedly shown you "things that override the operational documentation"
What about:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no611-100oct.jpg
and
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no74-100oct.jpg
and:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/6...-100octane.jpg

According to you 100 octane use is forbidden on the Spitfire I.

How is that we have whole squadrons running on 100 octane well before the BofB, and how is it the manual you claim is from July 1940 mentions the use of the Merlin II that went out of production in 1939?

:rolleyes:

Identify the RAF FC squadrons that were using 87 octane fuel and the RAF FC squadrons using 100 octane fuel in Sept 1940.

Can't do that, then just so much bovine manure from you.

When i look at this picture:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...40-April41.jpg
i see that in june 1940 336000 tons of 100 octane fuel were supposed to be used
336000 tons would be 10584000 gallons
used by about 700 fighters that would be 151200 gallons per fighter
Average consumption for the Merlin mostly climbing would be about 75 gallons/h, so we get 2016 h flight time for each fighter.
Divided by 30 days that would give about 67,2 h a day flight time.
Now, where is the error?

Or are this only the stocks?

Ummm....you forgot about the other RAF commands using 100 octane as it had become the main fuel for operational units so it was being used by bombers too.

When i read 192151000 gallons for 150 days for about 700 fighters at about 75 gallons/h i calculate 24,2h flight time a day. Confusing!

Yes.

See the 1st chart in post #292 for consumption.

Only the stocks.

I am afraid old son that you are a busted flush.

Stocks = Stocks i.e. what is stockpiled

Consumption = consumption i.e. what has been used.

What exactly is so difficult to understand

Trying to pretend that consumption is some form of reserve in a different place is plainly false, unless you can explain what fuel the UK was using. After all it had to come from somewhere.

PS I repeat the question about full conversion of FC to 100 Octane in May 1941, its a simple statement that you made, without any pressure and a simple question.

What do you have to support this statement?

You would expect far more from me if I made such a statement, so its only fair.

To not reply to such simple questions is in your words amaturish.

Wasn't only the 2nd groups Blenheims using it in the outer tanks for take off and escaping?

150 days?

10 July – 31 October 1940 = 114 days

Well they were ordered late 1938 so by late 1939 one can guess everything switched to 100 octane (the conversion to use 100 octane is not exactly a staggering piece of engineering achievement) but so far that is a guess, I also believe bomber command was cleared for the use of 100 octane in 1940.

Crumpp's theory on BoB being a transitional period is daft, the fuel transition was complete by the start, the only transition was the introduction of new marks of Spitfire.

Exactly, please explain why so much fuel was expended, yet Crumpp et al maintain that only about 1/3rd of the RAF's frontline fighter strength was responsible, plus Blenheim squadrons? Say 250 fighters? How did 250 fighters chew through 192,151,000 gallons of fuel? - by flying about 72 hrs a day. Whats more confusing, the fact that 192,151,000 gallons of 100 octane fuel was consumed, or that only a small proportion of FC's frontline strength was responsible for using it?

No doubt Crumpp will come up with some old shop-worn argument that Consumption didn't mean consumption, but he has no evidence for that either, just speculation.

Yes it is only the stocks. The fuel distributed to the supply system for use was only 10,000 tons for Jun-Aug 1940.

Considering that the RAF planned for 2770 tons for 4 squadrons of Hurricanes per week. Now that includes all the feeder/emergency fields to be stocked with a supply, 3 weeks of operational stores in case the trains gets bombed, and all the flying required.

Using their math, 10,000 tons is enough for 15 squadrons or adding 5 squadrons per month.

2770 tons = 6204800lb or 861778 gals. If we allow 75 gallons per sortie, this is sufficient fuel for 11490 sorties...

if we assume 3 sorties a day (an impossibly high number per day!), for 80 aircraft, this gives us enough fuel for 48 days at 240 sorties/day...:!:

Crumpp, you seem to have no problems producing pages of complex formulas regarding flight data but then fall flat on your face with these simple calculations...:rolleyes:

Source?

Which 15 Hurricane squadrons?

It is a little more complicated than that seadog. The RAF correctly plans for their logistical train to be interupted by the enemy.

Therefore, they correctly plan to emplace several weeks supply at the aerodrome, supply the emergency fields the aircraft might have to land at, and keep several more weeks of fuel dispursed around the log train earmarked for that unit.

If you just plan to have enough fuel on hand for what you are going to fly, then you will be in real trouble when the enemy bombs your airfield storage tanks, shoots your trucks up on the road, or hits the railyard. You will be out of the game in one enemy attack.

Read the logistical plan if they had to supply the 4 squadrons in France. That is the amount of fuel in the system earmarked for those squadrons to fly for just ONE WEEK.

If they want to continue to fly operationally and resupply their unit after an enemy attack, the RAF is planning to have some 8 weeks worth of fuel on the ground and available at short notice.

Don't you think that makes sense given the fact the Luftwaffe was targeting the airfields during the BoB?

So when you do your simplistic calculation for one week of flying, keep in mind, there is 8 weeks of fuel required to be available for that one week in the air.

Fuel available is not fuel consumed.

The document also assumed 154 gals per Hurricane sortie, which is exactly twice the actual figure, since tank capacity was 97 gals, and aircraft will not land with empty tanks. Actual consumption will be 1/2 what the document states, for the 3840 sorties which it estimates will be flown and that works out to 950 tons

The document correctly assumes that a squadron of Hurricanes would fly about 1 sortie/day per aircraft

In the UK every airbase is providing a reserve for every other base, unlike France where a number of bases had to be stocked in expectation of rapid movement between bases, and the expectation that a base might be used briefly, but intensely.

However, the document certainly confirms 100% 100 octane use by Hurricane squadrons in France.

This document states the daily consumption per squadron as 1870gals for 24 sorties or 77.9 gals/sortie:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nt-15may40.pdf

so this works out to 180 tons/month/squadron based upon 24 sorties/day.

Not forgetting that Crumpp has previously stated that "Making the conclusion Hurricanes were using 100 Octane in the Battle of France based off some logistical projections for future war is amatuerish and clumsey. It is a paper tiger. That document is a calculation of projected needs written on 7 May 1940. The British Expeditionary Force was on the Beaches of Dunkirk 18 days later.

How much of those calculation and projections for future war do you really think became ground reality in 18 days? "
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthr...213#post416213

A lot of nonsense, of course but just a reflection of how much Crumpp tries to twist things to suit his own POV.

So, there was enough 100 Octane stored in France to supply all Hurricanes and Blenheims with 8 weeks worth of fuel. As can be seen in just one WOPR (33rd 23 April 1940) there was 7,600 tons of 100 Octane fuel in the only logical location West of Suez ie; France
http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...0-page-006.jpg

It also means that the RAF provided all of its frontline Merlin engine FC squadrons in France with 100 Octane in May 1940, which make's Crumpp's continued assertions that only 16 squadrons of its frontline fighter squadrons in Britain were supplied look very suspect. 192,151,000 gallons or 61,000 tons was used between June-end October More than enough to supply all frontline FC fighters with plenty to spare.

So tell us again Crumpp, how did the RAF ensure that just a few squadrons used 100 Octane, while the rest went without? How was this allocated?

What were the logistical arrangements used toe ensure only 16 squadrons used 100 octane.

How were the pilots briefed "Sorry chaps X Y and Z squadrons get the 100 Octane today, the rest of you stick with 87"?

How about Crumpp provide some documentary evidence showing that frontline fighter squadrons were using 87 octane fuel on a consistent basis throughout the battle. He has been asked time and time again but has provided nothing.

If "west of suez" means the bef in france, why are then 3 quarters of the aviation fuel not 100 octane?

Somehow that doesn't make sense when there were only fighters using 100 octane.

Hi guys. I've just got back from my trip to the 1940's where I had a nice cup of tea with Hugh Dowding. Nice guy. Later on, the two of us met up with Churchill and went to the strip club.

He says that this is a generally irreconcilable issue since more detailed records were not being kept (it was a war, after all. Poor bloke seemed quite stressed).

He says that we should have all the different fuels (100 octane, 87 octane, c3, b4, etc) modeled in our game, and that if a particular mission builder wants to pit 87-octane spitfires against Fw 190-D9s, then that's their choice.

He also says that wasting so much energy arguing over what exact percentage of his units were using which fuel is very silly.

That ought to settle things, I think.

Keep going Crumpp. Everytime you open your mouth another piece of your credibility disappears.

This isn't a 'Rocky' movie, you're getting beaten up bad and the fight is over, they'll be no Hollywood comeback versus Creed and Drago.

Read page 3:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nt-15may40.pdf
note that only 100 octane is specified for the Hurricanes.
and then read:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o.../AASF-Fuel.pdf

and note that only 100 octane is specified for the Hurricanes.

Tell me Crumpp do you read your evidence before posting it?

The paper clearly states one week supply of fuel to be at the aerodrome enough for 480 sorties. The rest are reserves in different types of store, Advanced, Forward and Base Areas
There in much bigger trouble if they follow your idea and have it all up front

Yes I agree with you its always a good idea to read the logisitical plan.

Its one week supply on the aerodrome (480 sorties) and a further two weeks supply in the forward dump including the additional reserve (1360 sorties).

The stocks in the Advanced Base and Main Base areas give an additional 8 weeks of fuel (2 at the advanced base and 6 at the main base) at a rate of 120 sorties per week per squadron.

So the logistical plan is for eleven weeks of flying not one.


This is I am afraid total bull. Apart from the obvious fact that the paper covers 11 weeks of fuel and not 8 and there is three weeks of fuel available at or near the station, not one to assume that the RAF plan to lose 8 times to enemy action compared to what it uses in the air is rubbish. In the worse case scenario and all the one week supply of fuel at a station is destroyed in one go, which is unlikely as they were not all stored in the same place, the advanced stocks had a further 2 weeks supply of fuel.
Unless of course you can support your theory?

Its worth remembering that the RAF didn't lose any 100 octane in the BOB despite heavy attacks on the bases. If there is one thing the RAF knew about it was how to take care of its fuel.

Finally this paper has nothing to do with consumption reports, its an interesting diversion of the type you I admit are very good at. This is a plan not a report on consumption

Which of course reminds me, where did you support your other assertion about the complete transfer of FC in May 1941.
If you cannot support it then we will have to ignore it.

I love Jeff's attempts at logical thinking.

'All of its frontline Merlin engine FC squadrons in France' - now how many FC Squadrons were in France flying Hurricane's, like about SIX (depending on when you look at it, but when stocking was made, only six were there)?

How excactly does the fact that about six Hurricane Squadrons were supplied with 100 octane in France make it 'very suspect' (Jeff loves big words :D ) that Britain had only 16 squadrons of its frontline fighter squadrons supplied with 100 octane? (which is BTW documented as opposed to Jeff's fantasies).

I really, really try to understand his emulation of logical thinking. He basically says:

Statement A is 6 Sqns. in France using 100 octane
Statement B is 16 Sqns in total is using 100 octane
Statement A and B rule out each other...

:D :D

Likewise, you have been asked to provide some documentary evidence showing that frontline fighter squadrons were using 100 octane fuel on a consistent basis throughout the battle.

You have been asked time and time again but has provided nothing.

Problem is, the burden of proof is on you. Which is why just about anybody with a brain is unconvinced of your claims and have noted that your documentation is way insufficient to make the conclusions you are trying to make.

This as you know is rubbish. If you and I were to each submit a research paper on our opposing views I would be able to quote a mass of published works from different historians, participants in the battle, official papers, prime sources of data, publications from engineers, combat reports, station reports and others to support my case.
You would be limited in the extreame. Little more than an over emphasised minute from one meeting, an operating manual for an engine that had been out of production some time before the BOB and not a lot more

Now I agree that doesn't automatically mean that I am right, but the burden of proof is on you to support your case with facts not theories.

I have said many times that the case for is a strong one not a perfect one but its a heck of a lot better than he case that you have

Kurfurst must be very envious of the massive supporting evidence of 100 octane use by FC. Funny how he doesn't need even a fraction of this level of direct evidence and records to convinced himself that the Germans were using 100 octane though. One photo of a destroyed 109 is enough for him and it unquestionable from then on - Germany must have had it in abundance and were using it from day 1. :rolleyes:

What a fanboy.

And Crumpp, I reckon he only passes tests and exams because he grinds down the examining board. Probably failed his PPL but battered them into passing him because they had actual lives - it's like Chinese water torture.

You see that's your problem. You desperately try to support a fantasy by spamming a lot of irrevelant papers that do not even support your case, while all I need to is to produce about 5 papers which clearly support my case.

There's no theory here but facts. Fact is that the RAF originally meant to support a limited number of fighter Squadrons, fact is that the only paper available shows they did convert a limited number of fighter Squadrons by May 1940, fact is that full clearance was not given until August and fact is that fuel issues show the majority of the fuel issued during the Battle was 87 octane, fact is that evidence of 100 octane use only exist for about 1/3 of the Fighter stations, and even many of those only towards the end of the Battle.

Despite that perception of yours most people here handle your theory with a great deal of scepticism.

Sadly for you the use of 100 octane by the German fighters from the start of the Battle is documented in far greater detail than in the case of RAF Fighter Command. We know the exact dates, the exact units using the fuel, we have detailed records of German High Command meetings detailing these as well as British reports of captured fuel samples, photograph of downed aircraft and so on. We even know the exact amount of aircraft using the fuel at some date.

The envy and denial is all yours.

With such ridiculing, wrong statements you don't improve your image!!

He has never said or written what you have posted.

That 109 is proof that c3 fuel was used in frontline squadrons, as the number of mounted DB601N engines on Bf109 and Bf110 is evidence for it.

Though only a lesser part of all fighters used it.

I say it again, it is proofed that many british fighters used 100 octane, there is only evidence that ALL did use it.

There possibly will never be a PROOF that 100% of all fighters of the FC used 100 octane during the BoB, so this discussion is becoming more and more futile.

For CoD the implementation of duplicate models with slightly different FM shouldn't be that hard, i assume, so that the mission builders and server operators can create their version of the BoB / BoF / CB.

But only because no matter how often evidence is produced there will always be someone who says "ah! But you don't have a document showing that the out of commission aircraft that was being scrapped for parts wasn't leaking 87 octane rather than 100!"

When evidence becomes practically overwhealming it is as good as proof, the real futility is the resistance being put up against 100 octane fuel, this thread is 'not' about the LW use of 100 octane it is about the fact that right now the fuel modelled for the RAF is incorrect and more to the point the performance even for that fuel is incorrect, it really does seem there is only scope for single fuel types in game therefore the most prevalent ones should be modelled, in the case of the LW that is 'not' 100 octane and in th case of the RAF it is 100 octane.

But the evidence isn't overwhelming, there is lots of evidence for single flights, but where is i.e. the collection of reports from a single AC from ALL active fighter squadrons on a given day during the BoB, documenting the use of 100 octane on that day, that would be overwhelming evidence.

The evidenc is so far only indicating that there is a strong possibility that ALL used it.

This is a correct description IMHO for 1941. It is not a correct description for 1940.

It depends on what timeframe you are looking at.

The BoB era summer 1940 (unamended) manual of the Spitfire II clearly notes the limits being:

+12 lbs for take-off up to 1000 feet or 3 minutes.
+9 lbs for combat (5 minute limit)

This +12 lbs could be used near the deck of course, but its near useless since boost will immidiately start to fall with altitude (unlike the Spit / Hurri I's boost cutout, it does not lasts up to FTH).
Boost drop curves of Mk II trials suggest that even with the gate open, the boost will fall back from +12 at SL to normal combat rating of +9 lbs by 4000 feet altitude (ca. 1200 meters), obviously with the same performance.
Thus its somewhat similiar to the 109E/110C 1-minute takeoff boost - its effective up to 1-2000 meters only.

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...8&d=1335381803

It's only later, amended manuals (presumably from 1941) that are clearing +12 lbs for combat, too.

RAE tests were flown +9 lbs boost and 2850 rpm, as noted in the Spitfire II manual this was the 30-min rating at the time. It did not give the same power and performance as +9 lbs/3000 rpm, of course.

In short our Spitfire II with its maximum +9 lbs rating and performance is correct and historically accurate for the BoB airframe. +12 lbs rating was not cleared for it for combat use during the BoB period.

Should 1C decide to introduce a post-BoB 1941 variant (doubtful), a +12 lbs version would be feasible, of course.

something is not quite right about a 9lbs boost being ok for climb for 30 minutes when climbing is the more stressfull in terms of cooling etc and only having a 5 min limit in level flight with more cooling, I don't see why 9lbs boost and 2,850 rpm couldnt be maintained in level flight for at least 30 mins.

I don't see a reason either. These names for the ratings are somewhat arbitrary, naturally there's nothing preventing you from using 9lbs boost and 2,850 rpm for level flight, apart from temperatures and increasing engine wear. The names like 'combat' and 'climb' were somewhat arbitrary.

which logic dictates are lesser in terms of level flight.........it has occurred to me that those limitations seem more geared toward RPM as opposed to boost, if 9lbs boost can be used for 30 mins then tchnically it is not limiting, usually a 5 min limit is the true factor, this is still a factorisation that applies today even in jets, TO thrust is a 5 min limit, anything below that is a MCT (max continuous thrust), I susspect the 30 min limit is really a limit in terms of oil cooling for the prop govenor system.

Yes. Which is why they let you use 3000 rpm instead of 2850 rpm in level flight with the same boost. ;)

Like I said, the names were somewhat arbitrary, iirc in British manuals 'climb' rating was previously referred to as 'normal' (or the other way around?).

Back on new 100 octane models, the two things I wonder about:

1, What will be the new FM's be based on? There's not a single flight tests for +12 lbs performance. How are climb, turn etc. times are derieved - will they be estimated?

2, How will aircraft with a cooling system designed for ca. 900-1000 HP (+6.25) will cope with thermal loads occuring at 1100-1300 HP (+12 lbs). I would expect that temperature management will be more challanging at higher boost and power. Are there any radiator suitability figures available for the Spit/Hurri I?

2850 level seems an very extreme high number to me, but I have not flown that model much to have any real practical knowledge in game...:grin:

A higher "emergency" boost than the rated +9 was definitely used from 21 August 1940 on, there are combat report and ORBs that proof this.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...3aug40-orb.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...1aug40-orb.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...g40-orb541.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-21aug40-1.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-21aug40-2.jpg

Kurfürsts has the theory that the whole squadron called the regular climbing/rated boost of +9 boost in this instance "emergency boost". However he didn't came up with an explanation why they would do this.
Note that this reports explicitly mention "emergency boost" and don't mention "emergency power", the later could be interpreted as the normal "All out" setting of +9 and 3000 RPM, which was only allowed for emergencies. But as this is not the case it's clear that a boost higher than +9 was used in this instance.

There are also other reports from November 1940 that show the use of the boost control cut-out. The use of the cut-out only makes sense to increase boost beyond the rated +9 or when there is a failure in the boost control.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...son-2nov40.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...en-30nov40.jpg

Note that none of these papers ('proof') specify any kind of boost rating. They merely say they used max. power. And max. power was +9.

Because that was the maximum allowed for the Spitfire II as demonstrated.
Its no more than an awfully silly theory that when pilots made reference to emergency power, they meant using an emergency power far above the sanctioned limits for emergency power.

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...8&d=1335381803

In contrast 41Sqn_Banks has the theory that a reference to emergency boost *MUST* refer to +12 lbs, even though +12 lbs is not listed anywhere, not referred to by any pilot, report or manual.

I'd like to see the reasoning why it is so certain that a reference to the emergency rating refers to a higher than +9 lbs boost. I call it wishful thinking.

What he didn't came up is an explanation why would the Spitfire II manual lists +9 lbs as maximum combat boost (whereas the Spitfire I manual lists +12 lbs.)

All this is playing with the words, assuming a random rating which is not listed anywhere.

It's simply your assumption that the mention of emergency boost or cut out refers to +12 lbs.

My assumption is that emergency boost simply refers to the +9 lbs combat limit, which is underlined by the fact that this is the limit specified by the manual.

You are welcome to prove that emergency boost allowed for greater than +9 lbs, in the summer of 1940.

Problem is the maximum rating allowed was +9 lbs.

There's a logical failure in your assumption that the boost cut-out would increase boost beyond +9 lbs. Its quite likely in fact that the pilots obtained +9 by using the boost cut-out, as on the Spitfire I.

Fact is that the Spitfire I manual of the era lists +12 as the limit, obtainable with the boost cut-out. When Spitfire I pilots refer to using the boost, they sometimes specify the boost used as well (+12).

Its only logical that since the the Spitfire II manual of the era lists in contrast only +9 as the limit, it would mean that when Spitfire II pilots refer to using the +9 boost, w/o specifing the boost used and referring it in vague terms like 'emergency boost'.

P.S. Curious, isn't it, that there's not a single hint or tests for +12 Spitfire IIs isn't it.

But if we are going down the road of fantasy boosts that are much higher than the limits listed in the engine/aircraft manuals, I want my 1.7 ata 109E, too. Even though if the manuals say something completely different. Hell if official limits are to be ignored on Spitfires, we might as well ignore them on Messerschmitts as well, and come up with whatever fantasy we may like.

Kurfürst I'm not saying it was +12 boost, only that the boost must have been higher than +9, as it wouldn't make sense to use the cut-out without getting any benefit. I don't think there is so far any definite proof for the exact emergency boost value of the Spitfire II in 1940. However the fact that earlier (Merlin III), similar (Merlin XX) and later (Merlin 45) engines had +12 emergency boost in 1940 (the Merlin 45 of course in 1941), and the fact that +12 boost is documented for the Merlin XII for 1942(?) is a strong indicator that +12 boost was the emergency limitation of the Merlin XII.

BTW in RAF terminology "All-out" is not equal to "emergency". This can be seen in the Spitfire V test report: http://www.spitfireperformance.com/aa878.html

Of course this is not a Merlin XII engine but it shows that there could be different boost limitations for "all-out normal rating" and "all-out emergency".

With all due respect, the thing being modelled is the equipment, not the time period. If the IIa that was cleared for 9 lbs continuous is the same basic piece of equipment that was used in 1940, then we should have it.

If you want to model the orders from FC, then convince the various RAF squadrons to impose 6.25 lbs continuous on their pilots.

Otherwise, you should also be campaigning for the reduction in the 109 fuel tank to help simulate the time spent in France before heading over the channel and reducing fuel load, or whatever other things.

Simulate the tools, let us play with them as we see appropriate.

Predictably it took only about 3 more posts in the thread before........


I love this.....

max·i·mum (mks-mm)
n. pl. max·i·mums or max·i·ma (-m)
1.
a. The greatest possible quantity or degree.
b. The greatest quantity or degree reached or recorded; the upper limit of variation.
c. The time or period during which the highest point or degree is attained.
2. An upper limit permitted by law or other authority.

That would be 12 then.



Yes I'm struggling to see why anybody would try to save their life if it meant breaking a sanction.

You aren't reading the reports then. They do frequently say this but others say 'pull the tit' or 'through the gate', which means to operate the ABC therefore use 12lbs, otherwise it would be 6.25 or 9. It's RAF slang from the time.

More opinion.

Maybe it's because the engine would blow up after a while?? Jeez.......

We hear you Kurfurst. You think that 12lbs is 'fantasy' lol This thread is going to be locked, I can see it already.

This is contradicted by the July 1940 Spit II manual which you are quoting. 30 minute climb rating is +9psi, 30 minutes, 2850rpm. The boost cutout description is listed as EMERGENCY override of automatic boost control, sealed against inadvertant use. 30 minute climb is not an emergency, thus clearly +9psi is available on normal throttle operation (also +9psi is typically referred to as rated boost in Spit II publications).

It does beg the question, what kind of boost control override installation is being described in the July 1940 Spit II manual? An original type, which gives full throttle plate control in the event of controller failure and is unsuitable as a combat boost? Or the modified type, which is not really a cutout but an increment for the boost control setpoint (to +12psi)?. The July 1940 manual does not let us know.

It seems commonsense that the Spit II boost cutout was the +12psi type, and use of it as combat boost was approved and occurred during the BoB (although not in the July 1940 manual). This is considering the use of +12psi Spit I's during the same period and combat reports as above. But specific documents appear to be lacking.

camber

I think too that makes logical sense. Kurfürsts document mention 3 min +12 lbs take off power which translates into "it was physically possible to increase power to +12lbs". I would think now this is the case whether the landing gear is up or down. Now lets say, you fly down on the deck and a 109 is after you. Would you say "oh my, it is VERBOTEN to use +12 but MAYBE it's gonna save my sorry ass for some minutes and go to +12, or stay with the book that says "well, factory gives clearence only for +9 lbs while in flight, but then up to 30 mins". Or does the engine kinda know you're cheating and it just won't let you go to +12 because "it's not right"?

I also think it yould be strangeif one called something an "emergency boost" that you can use for 30 mins?

Zach

This is not correct. The "early" manual states that +9 is obtained when the throttle lever is at the rated gate position, see attachments.


Sorry for OT, maybe one of the moderators can move the posts into FM subforum.

Here's a couple more RAF Hurricane squadron Operations Record Books that mention 100 octane fuel.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...100-octane.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...100-octane.jpg

Which says that it was tested and later that it wasn´t avaiable...

Hmmmm, no 100 octane at Shawberry. Shawberry!!!!! Well, there you have it, then. (He misspelled "octane" as well, another indicator that this whole 100 octane thing is a hoax).

Good catch!

When viewed in context the picture is clearer. Other units and stations at the time were clearly doing quite a bit more than "tested" 100 octane:

151 Squadron
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...rb-16feb40.jpg

611 Squadron
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no611-100oct.jpg

74 Squadron
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no74-100oct.jpg

605 Squadron left Hawkinge on 28 May 1940 where 100 octane was obviously present enroute to Drem, also which obviously had 100 octane. For some reason they stopped over at Shawbury, which I understand was a Flying Training School and apparently didn't stock 100 octane ("unavailable"). It's interesting that it was determined that the Squadron was unable to proceed further without the 100 octane fuel. This suggests that once having converted to 100 octane, whatever fuel the flying school was using (87 octane?) was unsuitable.

610 Squadron Spitfire Mk I at Hawkinge in early July 1940. Note the petrol bowser marked for 100 octane fuel.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/n...e-july40-b.jpg

100 octane was required at Drem, 605 Squadron's destination, as well as Debden where 504 Squadron was based.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...0oct-issue.jpg

Obviously Drem was stocked with 100 octane fuel by February 1940

602 Squadron
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/6...-100octane.jpg

Fighter Station, With the Spitfires in Scotland. Flight, No. 1631 Vol. XXXVII, March 28, 1940 (602 Squadron at Drem)

111 Squadron
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...100-octane.jpg

End of story.

(reminds me awfully of the 150 grade tale :D )

Training schools didn't have 100 octane that was always the intention.

Remembering Crumpp insistance that the changes required to the aircraft/engine were extensive, its interesting to note how quickly the change over took place. On 15th Feb the squadron was released but found time to take part in some practice missions, drain the tanks for 100 Octane and the next day the squadron was available. Its also worth noting that Drem is a small satallite station with a limited infrastructure apart from day to day maintanence and fairly simple repair facilities.

Glider remember we are talking RAF here, they had to figure out which way to turn the spanner to take out the spark plugs :grin:

People should know when they are conquered.

Yeah, but don't take it too hard.

True story. I did a five year apprenticeship in the FAA in the early 70’s. Part way through the third year of the course by which time it’s fair to say that while far from being qualified, we didn’t count ourselves as being totally without skills. We had to do a whole day session on how to use a hammer. The instructor recognised that this was stupid, signed us off as having passed and let us catch up on revision, homework etc. So as they say, anything is possible

Thanks for sharing, lane. This one is rather unexpected, not that there was no 100 octane in Shawbury, but that they didn't continue without 100 octane.

I am just glad that the people at 1C were able to see through the Kurfurst and Crump smoke screen and gives us what the UK had during BoB, 100 oct power

No, it's overwhelming.

They did a long time ago. But thanks for making all of the real historians pull out hard evidence to nail the coffin lid down on your fantasy. :rolleyes:

It will be interesting when 1C gets around to modeling late war a/c with robtek's logic with regards to the 1.98ata Bf109K-4.

Don't be silly Al. The raids devastating the Ploieşti refineries in late 44 didn't affect fuel supplies at all. Any tactician knows that a successful fuel blockade can only be achieved through sinking about 5% of inbound fuel tankers ;) :D

Reading this about 42 (Maintenance) Group:

http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...intanancea.jpg

http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...ter7_0004a.jpg

shows that the RAF did not stock fuel at smaller airbases and that transport arrangements were flexible enough to allow the 100 Octane to be trucked to Shawbury using civilian drivers.

It also confirms that "Other Grades" meant 77 and 87 Octane fuel.

Info about Shawbury: "Home to 11 FTS and 27 MU..."

It also shows that the 800,000 ton reserve was overly optimistic.

Well unfortunately for you it was you who have argued that there were absolutely no Spitfires and Hurricanes flying with 87 octane fuel, they should not be in the sim, as you have claimed that the only ones ever flying were all 100 octane ones.

You wanted to enforce this fantasy on all others, and wanted that 1C should only model RAF fighters on 100 octane, and deprieve all others to have choice wheter to believe your fantasies or not.

The rest of us were deeply sceptical of your story. We've believed, and still believe of course that both RAF fighters were fueled by both 87 octane and 100 octane, depending on the station, and this was supported by massive evidence.

In the end, most of the 1C community and 1C developers took the more sensible, more realistic position that was well supported by the actual documentation and uniformly shared by respected authors.

They've acknowledged that the evidence for your story was unconvincing and insufficient, and I am sure after careful inspection of the available documents come to the same conclusion as the rest of us, that both 87 and 100 octane models were present in the Battle. They have ignored your revisionist version of history. Accordinly, and true to the historical reality, they have modelled both versions, which every ones of us, expect you and a handful of fanatics, has supported all the way along.


Twitch all you want about it, but you have lost and failed in your agenda.

Ha ha it's funny watching you misquote me and do you selective editing. Just to correct your LIES, I support 87 octane in game, just want the 100 available, because the only fighters fighting in 11 group mapped in game were using 100 octane. But you could always learn the FMB and turn off your Steam updates so you'll have an easy time online and live your dream that Hitler won the war.

The important thing is that your big lie was destroyed. I noticed that you said "Game Over", which means that your agenda wasn't historically based but rather that you're a crappy pilot who needs false advantages in game. I bet when you play FIFA on PS3 you turn off the red cards so you can foul the opposition lol

You mean you and Crumpp. We are talking about you, an extremist fanatic, and Crumpp, an 'advisor to the experts' who is willing to argue his case regardless of how obvious to everybody else that he is wrong. "Massive evidence" - LMAO!!!

Indeed they were sensible enough to disagree with you. You admitted defeat remember.......JAT

If you can get Luthier or Black Six to agree with this I'll eat my rudder pedals.


That must be why I posted this when the update was announced.:rolleyes:
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...9&postcount=33

Huzzah for 100 octane!!

You should congratulate yourselves on getting another thread locked
well done.