Brilliant! Where did you find this?

What's the excitement, we know for some time that the first stations changed over to 100 octane in February, hardly any news in that..

so you got any proof yet that any fighter in 11 group during BoB wasn't using 100 octane fuel yet........

and i mean proof, not your spam.

just one fighter report will do.......

are you ever going to rely on anything other than pre war documents, lol.

More sources
 

Funny how there's a complete lack of sources stating that RAF FC didn't exclusively use 100 octane fuel during the BofB...

More Oil...

http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...anerevised.jpg

Except the original documents.....

I believe that by the time the battle ended by the German dates, the entire RAF FC was using 100 Octane.

Maybe, just maybe, if you end the battle in November or December 1940, the entire RAF FC had converted.

If you want to say in July thru September 1940 that the entire FC had converted you would be wrong. They were in the process of converting during that time.

You can line up all the evidence presented until July 1940 and it fits perfectly within normal convention phase testing for adaptation.

The Notes on a Merlin Engine portion of the Operating Notes are part of the airworthiness of the design and list the specified fuel for the aircraft. The conversion was important enough to publish a very clear instructions for ALL OPERATIONAL UNITS to use 100 Octane when Fighter Command converted. You do not see that in any Notes on a Merlin Engine prior to January 1942.

Boost override was available and authorized to be used by the Operating Notes. That calls into question any combat report which makes a reference to any over boost condition as being proof of 100 Octane fuel use.

The logistical documents are just that, logistics and not operational. Before the operational side of the house can do anything, they must have the logistics solved and the materials in hand. That they had the stuff is not proof of when it was used. It is only proof that they had it which is not in dispute.

The consumption reports do not show any 100 Octane being out at the airfields in useable quantity until the June thru July timeframe. In those months, it represents a small portion of the fuel used. In the October and beyond, 100 Octane consumption clearly shows a marked increase to reach some 34% of the Air Ministries fuel supply "forward of the railheads". In other words, not sitting in a tanker as part of the strategic reserve.

In other words, the developers of IL2 CLOD would be accurate in modeling both types of fuel not in modeling 100 Octane exclusively.

Again, this is your thesis, but you have not presented any evidence to support your contention that RAF FC was using both 87 and 100 octane during the BofB (by British dates, from July 10 onward). The facts are that documents from March 1940 indicate that all new Merlin engined aircraft were equipped to utilize 100 octane, and given the wastage rates of existing aircraft, production rates of new aircraft and the conversion program for older aircraft, there simply wouldn't have been sufficient numbers, if any, of 87 octane only aircraft for RAF FC to have retained 87 octane as a front line fuel. The idea that RAF FC would retain 87 octane when all its fighters were equipped to handle 100 octane is simply preposterous, and completely unsupported by the facts, and a complete dearth of supporting evidence for 87 octane fuel use. The increase in 100 octane consumption was a reflection of the fact that the RAF won the BofB and RAF FC and BC were expanding rapidly.

Some more supporting data:

Prometheans in the Lab: Chemistry and the Making of the Modern World, McGrayne: "Britain's petroleum secretary Geoffrey Lloyd said later, "we wouldn't have won the Battle of Britain without 100 octane..." "p103.

Two Historians in Technology and War, Howard and Guilmartin:

Air Warfare: an International Encyclopaedia: A-L, Walter J. Boyne
others:

The Most Dangerous Enemy: An Illustrated History of the Battle of Britain
By Stephen Bungay p56, 59

and another:

Sydney Camm and the Hurricane, Fozard, Foreword by Sir Peter G. Masefield:

Masefield's bio:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obit...Masefield.html

Why would Masefield say that "...without... "100 octane fuel" - there would have been no prospect of success"?

Crumpp and Kurfurst go to college...
 

and present their history prof with a thesis:

"RAF FC used 87 octane and 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain"

"An excellent thesis" says the prof, at the start of the term, "if you can prove it you will have altered our understanding of one of the most crucial battles in modern history."

A few months later they are called into the prof's office: "How are you two getting along with your paper? I expected something from you by now...but I'll let you have a few more days. By the way, what proof have you got? Remember, the term is almost over, and I expected a finished paper by now."

Crumpp and Kurfurst pull out a 1/2 dozen pages and place them on the prof's desk: "Well we have some papers dating from 1938 and we think that some aircraft manuals state that 87 octane was required."

"Hmmm..." says the prof, staring at the meagre number of pages: "You mean to say that's all you've got? I think you need to go the library, the archives, and the even the web, and dig up some solid evidence for 87 octane use during the actual battle...after all there's numerous sources that state that 100 octane fuel was used during the battle. You are now making an 'extraordinary claim' which is all well and good but as you well know, extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof, and I'm sorry gentleman, but I don't see any such proof in the rather sparse data that you've presented.

Crumpp and Kurfurst look downcast and stare at their feet: "We have looked high and low and this is all we can come up with."

"Oh my" says the prof... he pauses for a few moments, moves back to marking papers and then glances up and states: "No problem gentlemen; you have a few more days...just make sure that your paper states that you conclude that your thesis is false, based upon the lack of any direct evidence for 87 octane fuel use, and the mass of contradictory evidence stating that 100 octane fuel was in universal use. Good day"

Evidently the authors are wrong. Germans were using 92/110 grade (later 96/145 grade) fuel through the war for their fighters, from the start of the Battle of Britain.

http://kurfurst.org/Engine/DB60x/fil...t1940b_DFC.jpg
http://kurfurst.org/Engine/Boostclea..._June44_C3.jpg
http://kurfurst.org/Engine/Boostclea..._July44_C3.jpg
http://kurfurst.org/Engine/Boostclea...ormandy_C3.jpg
http://kurfurst.org/Engine/Boostclea...4_Jan45_C3.jpg
http://kurfurst.org/Engine/Boostclea...ort_G10_C3.jpg
http://kurfurst.org/Engine/Boostclea...aDelCaccia.jpg
http://kurfurst.org/Engine/Boostclea..._JapoG10U4.jpg


Evidently the authors are wrong in this as well. The Germans did not rely on crude oil to produce their high own high octane aviation fuel, but on the synthetic oil produced from coal. Both their high and normal octane aviation fuels had the same composition, expect for additional aromatics in their high octane fuel, which was produced by getting the normal grade fuel through an extra chemical process.

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...7&d=1337621766




Air Warfare: an International Encyclopaedia: A-L, Walter J. Boyne

Evidently Boyne's research was sloppy too. The Germans were using synthethic 92/110 octane fuel for their Me 109s, Me 110s and Ju 88 during the Battle of Britain. In early 1941, practically all of the Luftwaffe se fighters converted to 100 octane (109E-7/N, F-1, F-2).

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/att...2-c3_table.jpg

Sydney Camm and the Hurricane, Fozard, Foreword by Sir Peter G. Masefield:

Because he overstates technical aspects over operational aspects. BTW loss rates of RAF fighters to German fighters is sobering - it ran around 2:1 in the German's favour during the Battle. RAF Fighter Command lost over 100% of the force it started the Battle within four months.

Again, with the 1938 documents, which have no bearing on the BofB...:-P Contemporary 1940 documents clearly establish that more than adequate supplies of 100 octane fuel were in stock and under production during the battle. If you have no evidence of RAF FC use of 87 octane, why don't you simply state that?

German use or not, as the case may be, of hundred octane fuel, has no bearing on RAF FC use of said fuel during the BofB. Again, you have no evidence for RAF FC use of 87 octane fuel, yet there is abundant sources and direct evidence for the production, and use of 100 octane fuel by the entire RAF FC from July 10 1940 onward, while no evidence for even a single RAF FC frontline Hurricane/Spitfire combat sortie during the BofB, has ever been produced, despite the logistical nightmare that this would have created for RAF FC, not to mention the morale effect of having only select units using 100 octane fuel, when every fighter in RAF FC was capable of using it.

RAF FC was tasked with destroying Luftwaffe bombers, and it did this in large enough numbers to win the battle, and achieve an overall kill ratio superiority during the BofB. The Luftwaffe lost the battle and it's Commander in chief, went on to accuse his own fighter pilots of cowardice; why?

BTW, how many French Channel based Me109s were using 100 octane on July 10 1940? On Aug 1 1940? On Sept 1 1940? On Oct 1 1940? How are 1944 documents relevant to this discussion?

When i read this, or one of the countless other, 100-octane threads i see two sides:

a) FC used only 100 octane through the BoB

b) FC was in the conversion from 87 octane to 100 octane and used both fuels

where

a) has lots of evidence that 100 octane was used but no proof that 87 octane was not used

b) has evidence that 87 octane was used in the RAF and possibly in the FC but can not prove the use by the FC

my resume would be

a) tends to see the world in black or white, which never works this way in real life

b) says that there is always a grey area, which should be taken in account, a practical approach, imo.

Evidence for 100 octane fuel use and no evidence for 87 octane fuel use = proof of 100% 100 octane fuel use by RAF FC

If no 87 octane was used then we expect to see no evidence for its use, and indeed there is no such evidence.

British Piston Aeroengines and their aircraft:
"...As a result of satisfactory trials in March 1940, it was decided to switch Fighter Command to 100 Octane fuel, followed by Bombed Command about year later..." p313

The fact that Dowding felt the need to send out a memo to all squadrons in FC during the early stages of the battle reminding all pilots not to use +12 lbs boost for trivial reasons is proof enough that all squadrons were using 100 octane fuel.

By your analogy (one side lots of evidence, the other side not so much - but a more practical approach) anything can be proven - which is precisely how the various conspiracy theories about JFK's assassination, or whether or not Apollo reached the moon work. Just produce enough "evidence" to leave a little doubt, and throw lots of smoke and noise around to provide distraction and make the few facts thrown in seem far more important than they really are. I guess it works because people are taken in by this ahistorical approach to historical research all the time.

Crumpp and Kurfurst go to college...
 

It looks like they're headed for a failing grade...:rolleyes:

Anyone who has had to write a paper knows that they have to provide evidence for their thesis, and to date none has been forthcoming, for Crumpp and Kurfurst's thesis of mixed 87 octane and 100 octane fuel use by RAF FC during the BofB.

The facts are:

1. evidence is no proof

2. to preclude a possibility, however remote, without proof is unscientific

Evidence is no proof? That means any evidence can be dismissed out of hand, regardless of how solid it is. How do you work that one out?

If that's true, I can prove the moon is made out of cheese; the evidence is lacking because when the Apollo astronauts landed with samples of moon cheese they were immediately turned into toasted cheese sandwiches and eaten by hungry NASA staff, and the reports were then fudged and rocks were substituted.

Now, you can provide evidence in the form of moon rocks and scientific reports and I can dismiss the evidence because I didn't actually travel to the moon with the astronauts and watch them pick up the rocks, nor did I see the scientific reports being processed. So the fact is the moon is made out of cheese and my belief in that is scientific because I am not precluding the possibility, however remote it may seem; in fact there's even a web page showing that the moon is made of cheese and that's evidence in itself. It's a brilliant concept because I can prove anything I like! :cool:

The problem is only seeing black and white, believe me.

Black and white scenarios are so rare in real life, i really doubt anybody here has experienced one.

To think in black and white makes only shure you are NOT 100% right.

Evidence is only proof if it removes any doubt.

Meaning absolutely nothing can be proven, no matter how much evidence is presented, because there will always be doubt in someone's mind. All this is is a very convenient out from using ones brains, or for those who refuse to believe any evidence, no matter how compelling.

And for me, that clinches it: the moon is made out of cheese and there's nothing anyone can show me that will remove any doubt. NASA plotted to keep this important information from the public and Neil Armstrong ate the evidence. :cool:

Robtek, I find the argue with fanatics is a waste of time. You can't fix their head.

It's already been pointed out that common sense has to apply here. There was high turnover of fighter aircraft during the BoB by all squadrons -- combat, accidents, engine/airframe wear & tear. There was no shortage of replacement aircraft. It stands to reason the replacement aircraft were factory-new and using 100 octane.

The airfields did NOT have two sets of fuel bowsers driving about the dispersal area looking to see who took 87 or 100 octane. There was a war on, fergawdsakes!!!! :rolleyes:

Priceless

This is a valid point, it would stand to reason that in the mayhem that would be fixing aircraft and high turnaround during raids that the organisation that would be necessary to ensure no 100 octane got in the non-modified engines would have been remarked on by some source.

Very likely, but I'm not going to spend these fine Spring mornings searching through dusty tomes to check! LOL

A question, though. In motor vehicles it doesn't really matter if you put 89 or 91 (or even 94 like we can get locally in Ontario) octane gas in a vehicle rated for 87 octane. You're just wasting money on the higher octane gas since you'll see no performance benefit, but the higher octane won't damage your 87-rated engine. Would this apply to Merlin engines rated at 87 octane that received a fill up of 100 octane?

If there were no harm (or benefit) that would come of this, I could see at the start of the Battle of Britain some of the older Spits & Hurries receiving 100 octane out on the field.

The answer is also certainly yes, unless some extra complication occure - spark plugs may foul from deposits because the different chemical composition of different grade fuel, for example, as happened with 150 grade. But overall this seems unlikely, at least the papers I have show the Germans too were running some of their Ju 88s - which's engine was designed for 87 octane - on their own 100 octane fuel. So the practice for it was there, on both sides.

Info on 100 octane and 12lb boost - March 1940
 

and from the article Fighter Station in the same issue:

Of course they did. They had more than two sets when Jets came along too.

The Germans had even more. They used LOX and LNOX. You don't want to mix those two up.

Fortunately they had different nozzles and you would have to be pretty dense to force it past the filler plate.

That is why aircraft are required to be correctly placarded at all fill points. It is part of the airworthiness.

Nothing in any of those references says a thing about exclusive use or 100% of Fighter Command using 100 Octane. It says they used it and not the quantity or frequency.

In otherwords, YOU say "ALL OPERATIONAL UNITS - 100 Octane Fuel Only" in early 1940 but the RAF does not say that until January 1942.

Almost. Most RAF front line stations had one tanker for 87 octane for visiting non operational aircraft but to all intents and purposes they only had one set of bowsers for operational use. This is a general statement but the modern tankers that could refuel two or three aircraft at the same time were used for ops, the older single point tanker tended to be for 87 Octane.

There was an amusing side to this in the NA. Churchill was visiting a fighter station during the BOB when one of the junior pilots said that the turnaround time could be much improved if the staions had just one extra tanker. Churchill wrote to the Chief of the Air Staff about this wanting more information. The CAS had to get his people to look into it and prove beyond any doubt that the main problem with turn around time wasn't fuel it was the time taken to rearm the eight guns on the fighters. Back came Churchill asking what he was doing about it and in the end they trained other station personell such as guards in some of the rearming tasks so if there was a rush they could help out.
What was interesting were the words the CAS was using. You could almost feel his frustration at have to spend a fair amount of time on a topic caused by a junior officer. Equally it showed the care that CHurchill put into listening to his pilots.

When are we going to read a post stating which squadrons were using 87 fuel and which 16 squadrons were using 100 fuel by the end of Sept 1940?

My thesis is this:

RAF FC used 100 octane exclusively during the BofB.

There is abundant evidence for 100 octane use, and that its' use was critical to victory. There are no references (and I mean NO, none, zilch, nada, etc etc...) to 87 octane use during the battle.

The available data supports my thesis. It does not support your thesis of mixed 87 and 100 octane use. In the absence of evidence your thesis fails, but the absence of evidence for 87 octane is what my theory predicts; my theory, therefore, fits the facts, while yours doesn't.

Is this your 1942 manual for the Mk I Spitfire or some other paper that I have missed?

I hardly think 100 Octane was critical to victory.

The RAF won because they fought every day and they had a logistical system they allowed them to replace their losses.

That same logistical system, the Civilian Repair Organization combined with some very good pre-war planning in manufacture, allowed them to increase their numerical superiority during the battle.

So while the RAF took heavier losses in air to air combat compared to the Luftwaffe, they replaced those losses at a faster rate and were able to move from numerical parity in Single Engine fighters to numerical superiority during the battle.

The raf took heavier losses? Didnt know that. I thought they had to shoot them down at a better rate than 2-1 to win

Don't think so
After a quick search I found this. I'm sure there are other sources. From my understanding Britain had more of a problem replacing pilots than planes. Still they did have the home ground advantage.

http://cz-raf.hyperlink.cz/BoB/stat.html

I think what Crumpp is getting at is purely fighter vs fighter, in which he is correct.

Of course this is ridiculous as the only opposition for the Luftwaffe was RAF fighters, but the RAF had bombers to shoot down as well.

Air superiority is only important so your airforce can inflict damage on the ground after all, and was the German goal for an invasion....

But he has to show that the Luftwaffe were superior somehow.

Numerical parity?

Aug 13 1940
Jafu 2 and 3 had 891 Bf109s while 11 Group had maybe 440 (22 sqd x 20 a/c) Spitfires/Hurricanes.

440 spits and hurris against 891 whine 'o' 9's.....i call that a parity :)

On the 13th August 1940 at 09.00 hrs Fighter Command had the following servicable fighters in the UK

■Blenheim - 71
■Spitfire - 226
■Hurricane - 353
■Defiant - 26
■Gladiator - 2

People get hung up about numbers of aircraft but as has been stated pilots are much more important. It takes a lot longer to train a pilot than build an aircraft and you cannot just up the production.

For the Luftwaffe Pilots were if anything a bigger problem than for the RAF.

On the 29th June the Luftwaffe had 856 servicable single engine fighters and 906 pilots ready for duty
On the 29th September the Luftwaffe had 712 servicable single engined fighters and 676 pilots ready for duty

On the 29th September the RAF had the following servicable fighters:-

■Blenheim - 59
■Spitfire - 227
■Hurricane - 387
■Defiant - 16
■Gladiator - 8

The earliest numbers I have for the ARF servicability are for the 17th July

■Blenheim - 67
■Spitfire - 237
■Hurricane - 331
■Defiant - 20


So if your comparing 109's against Spits and Hurricanes the RAF broadly speaking retained their strength whereas the 109's were reduced significantly and without the 109 the air war couldn't be won

Yes the RAF took heavier losses than the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe consistantly won the aerial engagements but each loss the RAF inflicted added up in the big picture.

The RAF logistical system was able to maintain and replace their losses while the Luftwaffe's system was not.

Both airforces had pilot shortages before the battle even began.

The basic difference in the two logistical systems was who was responsible for repairs.

The Luftwaffe Jadgegeschwaders TO was responsible for each aircraft in the unit. When it was damaged, he had to see to its repair with his unit assigned maintenance personnel. If it required organizational level maintenance, then the airframe was sent off but still remained on that Geschwader's books. The unit was down an airframe until it came back repaired or was stricken off and replaced.

The Squadrons in the RAF did not own the airframe. Squadron maintenance personnel performed for the most part only basic maintenance and mission configuration changes. The RAF had an organization called the Civilian Repair Organization. Basically every airplane repair facility in the United Kingdom was pressed into service repairing RAF aircraft and was made responsible under Air Ministry supervision for the airframes. They also ran the ASU or Aircraft Supply Units which were storage facilities located on British airfields that housed the airframes that were ready for issue.

As an aircraft was damaged and could not be repaired for the next flight, it would be pushed to the side and the CRO would take responsibility of it. They would issue a servicable aircraft and repair the damaged one putting it back in the ASU when repairs were completed.

This translated into the RAF being able to keep their units at a much higher strength throughout the course of the battle despite their higher loss rate.

The logistical genius of the CRO/ASU combined with some good pre-war planning on the industrial side so that the United Kingdom exceeded its aircraft production goals in single engine fighters and outproduced the German 2:1. The serviceability rates of the RAF actually rose during the battle to 98% while the Luftwaffe's servicability rates steadily declined.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m...g=content;col1

Total losses of aircraft in the Battle of Britain


Month----------------RAF------Luftwaffe
July (from10th)------90--------165
August--------------399-------612
September-----------416------ 554
October-------------182------- 321
Total----------------1087----- 1652

this (posted by someone above, dont know if its accurate) shows that the germans took considerably heavier losses, or am i missing the point entirely here :confused:

What a load of BS.

Total losses of aircraft in the Battle of Britain

Assuming these are correct, haven't checked from my books

Month----------------RAF------Luftwaffe
July (from10th)------90--------165
August--------------399-------612
September-----------416------ 554
October-------------182------- 321
Total----------------1087----- 1652

The RAF did loose more fighters than the Luftwaffe, but not more planes.

So much for consistently winning the aerial engagements.

Or do bombers not count.......

The air must be very thin where Crumpp is....the guy is just not right in the head.

Yes, classic symptoms of oxygen starvation!

I just finished reading Stainhilper's 'Spitfire on my tail' again and he thinks otherwise. :grin:

No, it was the other way around, that's why they lost this 'Battle of Britain'.

To be fair to Crumpp he is correct about the British having a better production and repair set up so the RAF were never in any real danger of running out of aircraft.

However the RAF were training more pilots than the Luftwaffe which enabled them to maintain the numbrs. No one is trying to pretend that the mid 1940 training of the RAF was up to pre war standards but then again neither was the Luftwaffe training.
The RAF trained 300 pilots a year in 1935, by August 1940 they were training 7,000 pilots a year. You do not get that size of increase without problems and shortages of everything, training aircraft, trainers, airfields take your pick. I do not know the numbers for the Luftwaffe but would expect them to also suffer shortages as they would also be ramping up whilst fighting a major campaign

Basically the RAF were better prepared infrastructure wise that the Luftwaffe (including fuel)

I totally disagree with his assertion that the Luftwaffe consistantly won the air battles. If he could support that with numbers lost compared to actual kills it would be interesting. Or he could explain why so many bomber raids were turned back before reaching the target, a lot got through but a lot didn't.

My understanding was that the appalling losses inflicted by the Luftwaffe on RAF Bomber Command was instrumental in switching to night bombing, and the subsequent development of the various navigation aids such as Oboe, GEE, H2S, etc.

Partly true. There is no doubt that the RAF switched its heavy long range bombers to night raids although a number of daylight raids continued all through the war. The RAF always had a strong interest in night raids for instance I don't think the Whitley was ever used on a daylight raid, but it is true to say that the losses forced a switch to night raids. However No 2 Group concentrated on daylight raids all through the war. I cannot think of any raids that did not get to the target, no doubt some didn't but the vast majority did.

But we are talking about the BOB. If the Germans according to Crumpp won the vast majority of the engagements, why were a number of the raids turned back.

Also, the mauling that the Luftwaffe bombers had during BoB (during the air battles that the Luftwaffe consistently won:rolleyes:), was why they to switched to night bombing too, ever heard of the Blitz?

Next Crumpp will be telling us that the Luftwaffe won the BofB...:rolleyes:

So essentially Crumpp has been trying to tell us - over several threads and in interminable detail - that logistically the RAF was not able to provide sufficient 100 octane fuel to allow all frontline, single-engined fighters to operate using the fuel, yet was able to ensure an adequate supply of fighters, both through the factories and through the CRO/ASU repair organisations.

I would think that an organisation which had the logistical genius to plan pre-war for high production rates, and set up proper repair facilities in wartime, also had the nouse to provide all of its frontline units with the best available fuel, contrary to Crumpp's stated beliefs.

http://i.imgur.com/SwoW0.png

And your point Mr Doggles?

If you have nothing to add but insult, please don't post. It is one thing to strongly disagree with each other, but it's another to take it personal and carry personal issues over to every other topic possible. It will just serve to get interesting topics spoiled, destroyed and locked and members banned. It's annoying.

That guy in the graphic? That's you and whoever else keep slagging the 100 octane issue and the ad hominem attacks, especially after the other thread's been locked. Please just stop.

This thread is about the incorrect modeling of 12lb boost in CloD.

It's really not necessary to keep taking swings at each other. NZTyphoon isn't adding anything of value, he's just trying to stir up the argument again, like the guy in the pic I posted.

You've just said "It's really not necessary to keep taking swings at each other" and then with the following sentence took a swing......shakes head mystified......

Still, I'm very happy to keep this thread just about the incorrect modelling of 100 octane fuel, which is incorrect of course.

Well, I'm hoping the next patch will render all these discussions moot, in addition to addressing the 109 shortcomings as well.

More evidence:

87 Octane was not used by RAF FC in frontline squadrons during the BofB.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=82_xzHcAQgo

Why is it proof?

Some guy says these aliens exist!! It must be true.

OMG Crumpp has turned into raaaid.......

[QUOTE=Crumpp;429244Why is it proof?

Some guy says these aliens exist!! It must be true.[/QUOTE]

Some guy says that the RAF used 87 octane on ops in the BOB with the same level of evidence. Is he the same guy?

All sorts of things can be proven to be true even if there isn't any evidence to prove it - the reasoning goes that the evidence hasn't been found yet, or its a plot by ***** (add secret organisation here) to hide the truth from the great unwashed. For example, did anyone know that Hitler was a British Secret Agent???!!! And wait, there's MORE - Osama Bin Laden was an American Agent!!!!!!!!

Therefore, FC must have used 87 octane for the majority of its frontline, single engined fighters during the B of B because the evidence is out there...somewhere...

I'm sure that you believe in them, but regarding 87 octane and RAF FC during the BofB, you have yet to provide even a shred of evidence for your contention.

I suspect that there's more chance of bumping into aliens than seeing these pilot anecdotes of flying at +16 LBS on 87 octane.

What proof do you have that front line squadrons used 87 octane fuel? Don't bother saying manuals/notes but give the Squadrons in 11 Group that used 87 octane fuel.

There has to be at least 6 as the other 16 squadrons were using 100 octane fuel as per Morgan and Shacklady.

David,

Have you found evidence that all Fighter Command Squadrons were using 100 octane fuel yet?

Do you still propose that thesis?

Kurfurst, have you found any evidence that a single fighter in 11 group used 87 octane fuel during BoB yet?

We're still waiting.

Don't bother quoting the prewar document again, its worthless.

Out of curiosity, what sort of evidence do you have in mind?

Out of curiosity, who are 'we'?

Other than it is the specified fuel and listed in all the Operating Notes besides the Spitfire Mk II as the required fuel for the type?

Or the fact it is the largest portion of aviation fuel in the Air Ministry and 100 Octane does not make a significant portion of fuel at the airfields until after October 1940?

Seems a pretty lock tight case that 87 Octane fuel was used in considerable amounts....at least according to the Air Ministry.

So what RAF FC squadrons were using 87 octane fuel.

Well of course 87 octane fuel was used in considerable amounts as the a/c in other RAF Commands require the fuel. :rolleyes:

Ignoring the evidence re 12 lb boost being linked to 100 octane

After it had been released to All operational Commands so not unexpected.

Correct, by Bomber Command, Training Command, Coastal Command, Manufaturing plants of engines and aircraft, BOAC and of course other Non operational units but not operational Fighter Command units.

You are the one that seems to stick to the 16 + 2 pre war proposal, but have no papers to support it. All we ( you can include me in that we) are waiting for is anything that supports your contention.
Anything at all, a reference to which squadrons, or which stations, or any decision as to timing or reporting path, a book that complains about being moved to an 87 otane unit/station or indeed one that rejoices as the move to a 100 octane unit/station. Absolutely anything at all, note not everything that supports your view, just anything that supports your view

Source please for 87 octane not being issued operational Fighter Command units.

I say you just made that up.

I will rephrase it, 87 octane was used in fighter command for operational missions until the switchover to 100 Octane. However there is no evidence that 87 octane was used for combat missions after the switchover during the BOB from July onwards.

Now if you or Crumpp can supply any evidence that says 87 octane was used in operational missions in or after July 1940 a lot of people would be very interested.

You show us your evidence for 87 octane use, for even one combat sortie by an operational Hurricane/Spitfire squadron during the BofB.

We're getting a bit tired of your reliance on 1938 documents.

You won't because they used 100 octane, exclusively, throughout the battle.

I think this is my new sig.

You'll find it in the same place as the source for tomato ketchup not being issued as ammunition.

Thank you. When did this alleged switch over to 100 octane happened, dear David? With documentary evidence if possible.

Of course, since it was standard fuel in the RAF. Similarly, there's no evidence that 100 octane fuel was used in more than a a couple of dozen cases out of thousands of fighter sorties, right David?


Let's get back to that allaged switchover, now you have seem to have changed your position and now state that this was supposed to have happened in July 1940. What documentary evidence can you offer to this so-called switchover, David?

Again, we need to specify the type of evidence required. Should combat reports that do not mention the use of emergency boost or +12 lbs/sq.inch constitute such an evidence, David?

Notice that Kurfurst has deliberately avoided the fact that guns in the BoB were armed with common sauces.

The Luftwaffe had access to British HP brown sauce after over-running British bases in France 1940 and decided that it was suitably spicy to load their MG's with it before moving to their own brand. The RAF tried it but stocks were low so switched to tomato ketchup just before the BOB. This was issued to all airfield NAAFI wagons and armourers would just take all the sachets direct from there. If you correlate the growth of Heinz and HP companies from pre to post war, looking at use of sauces, and the fact that there is no mention of this in any flight report anywhere ever, then we can conclude that it was in full use by both sides. I think the British experimented with Indian curry sauce on the Spitfire Ib model but it was a bit lumpy and the guns would jam. That squadron asked for their ketchup back immediately.

Since there is no evidence of this it can't be ruled out.

Still both sides have evidence but no proof.

The issue seems very similar to the "schroeders cat" problem.

Everybody and his uncle "knows" the cat is dead, but it can't be proven until the box is opened.

So, everybody, and his uncle, "knows" there was only 100 oct. used by the active part of the FC, but as in "Schroeders cat" all possibilities are equal true until there is proof (box opened).

Actually we have lots of evidence for squadron usage even prior to the BofB - and lots of sources stating conversion of RAF FC in the Spring of 1940.

Show me the evidence for 87 octane fuel use by RAF FC during the BofB.

100 octane - lots of evidence.
87 octane - no evidence.

What's the difference between evidence and proof?

More than 184 posts! :)

One side has evidence of widespread use if only the use of on average approx 10,000 tons a month until 100 Octane was issued to all operational commands. We know that Bomber Command, Coastal Command plus non operational units didn't use 100 Octane until August/September. So its worth trying to work out who was using 10,000 tons a month if it wasn't fighter command and no 2 Group.

I am very confident that Kurfursts couple of dozen sorties will not account for 10,000 tons.
That also ignores the other papers that I am not going to mention as they have been raised before

Glider evades to give a straight answer.

fixed.

No, Kurfurst is just making up stories that 87 Octane was used in operational FC units, with absolutely no written evidence to back such claims. In fact Payton-Smith makes it specific that 87 octane was used for non-operational flying (top of p 56).
http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...anerevised.jpg

and Dowding specifies it in a circular to all FC units

http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...g-page-001.jpg

http://i91.photobucket.com/albums/k3...g-page-002.jpg

NB: Kurfurst tried to post his "evidence" of the "Pips' Papers" in the bugtracker report http://www.il2bugtracker.com/issues/174 only to have it tossed out - twice (# 41 and 61) by unanimous decision; # 66 he demanded that my post # 65 be deleted, complaining it was nothing but spam, and that demand got tossed out as well. Personally I couldn't care less if Kurfurst and Crumpp don't believe that all FC frontline units used 100 Octane - their opinions don't count because they don't have any evidence to back up their own claims, apart from some pre-war planning papers.

Glider evades the straight answer then disappears, NZTyphoon becomes hysterical and tosses some bile and a smokescreen. He also couldn't care less about the 100 octane fuel issue, then he registeres on three separate boards just to argue about it and makes almost 300 posts about it 3 months. Expects to be taken seriously.

http://bluejacket.com/usn/images/sp/...oke-screen.jpg

Well summarized and logical assessement robtek, though I assume the words of reason will fail to have an effect on blindfolded minds.

My documentation has been posted a number of times and is supported by the on average 10,000 tons of fuel consumed each month. In short the 10,000 tons was used by FC and I believe that FC and No 2 Group were converted by the end of May. I have said a number of times its a strong not a perfect case, an honest statement.

If Kurfurst would like to explain how 10,000 tons were used each month, if not by FC then I would be interested to know who did.

Indeed I would be interested to know how much of FC he believes were using 100 Octane in the Period Fen to Aug 1940

David you continue to evade to answer the question posed.

Earlier this thread you have seem to have changed your position and due to your lasting silence on the matter it is increasingly likely that you have simple made up a falsehood about a supposed Fighter Command change-over to 100 octane fuel in July 1940.

You have made a very specific claim for a very specific date.

What documentary evidence can you offer to this alleged switchover, David?

fixed

fixed

Everything that gets posted is not always worth responding too....

;)

The words I used were

However there is no evidence that 87 octane was used for combat missions after the switchover during the BOB from July onwards.

There is no evidence for 87 octane being used in combat for June either however I have worked n the roll out of IT systems across scores of establishments for HMG and inevitably there is at least one site where the there is a delay for one reason or another. So I was leaving June free in case of such a delay, no more no less. Its what Programme Managers call Contingency

Which leaves the small matter outstanding such as, to what extent do you believe 100 Octane was used by the RAF in the BOB from Feb to Aug 1940

And how on Earth is this proof to complete changeover to 100 octane, which is what you claim?

The vast majority of those who have participated in these discussions readily understand that the evidence is insufficient to make categorical conclusions about the sole use of this or that fuel. You simply tend to jump one logical step.

My position was made clear 14 months ago on the matter in the thread you have participated, despite this you continuously claim that my position is unclear.

Since you have refuse to spend the time (apprx. 1 minute search) required to understand my position I make it clear to you again. You can read it again on this page:

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthr...t=20110&page=5

Note that the current level of evidence shows 8 out of 19 Sector Airfields and 9 out of 32 Fighter Airfields using 100 octane fuel. Also note that many of these stations only show sign of 100 octane use in August or later and not before.

Are you serious?

Guys......we need to give up on Crumpp and Kurfurst....let them have their fantasy, only the devs need to be aware of the obvious truth or else COD is just going to be a complete 'what if' for the LW fantasists.

I am full of admiration for those who have the strength and desire to keep sterile discussions with such people

:rolleyes: